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I.  INTRODUCTION:  RING V. ARIZONA EIGHT YEARS LATER 
When it was decided in 2002, Ring v. Arizona1 appeared to be a wa-
tershed in the way capital sentences are handed out in the United 
States.  Ring announced that the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey2 applied 
to capital sentencing and required that any fact necessary to the im-
position of the death penalty be proven to a jury and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.  No longer could states remove capital decision mak-
ing entirely from juries (as many states had done prior to Ring); 
rather, Ring appeared to signal that the jury has an important role to 
play in determining who lives and who dies. 
Ring was initially seen, both by its proponents and its detractors, as 
a sea change in the way states could structure their capital decision 
making; it overturned several states’ death penalty statutes and ap-
peared to imperil many more.3  Yet eight years after the case was de-
cided, it is not clear what, if anything, Ring demands of the states.  As 
Justice Scalia made clear in his Ring concurrence, the case does not 
grant the right to have a jury determine a capital sentence.  Rather, it 
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 1 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 2 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as ap-
plied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that “[o]ther than the fact of 
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt”). 
 3 See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The Ultimate Authority on the Ultimate Punishment:  The Requisite 
Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2003) (“At the very least, 
Ring’s express overruling of Walton calls into question—and justifies a revisiting of—a 
quarter-century of jurisprudence on the role of the jury in capital sentencing.”). 
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only precludes a judge from finding the facts that make the defendant 
eligible for a sentence of death;4 the ultimate sentence may still be 
imposed by a judge sitting without a jury.  However, determining ex-
actly what decision making constitutes fact finding and, therefore, 
which tasks must be carried out by the capital jury rather than a 
judge, remains a challenging task.5 
In this Article, we investigate the impact of Ring by analyzing four 
typical capital statutes against both the language of the Ring opinion 
and the broader context of the Court’s Sixth and Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  What we find is that in all but the most obvious cases, 
Ring’s mandate is an extraordinarily weak one.  Beyond these easiest 
cases, fact finding is a difficult concept to define6 and, as a result, 
state courts have consistently minimized Ring’s impact on their capi-
tal systems.  In the absence of firm guidance from the Supreme 
Court, the states have been left free to read Ring as they wish and 
have generally used this freedom to read Ring very narrowly. 
To the extent that states are unwilling to hand complete control 
of capital cases over to juries (and, for various reasons many seem 
unwilling to do so)7 Ring creates perverse incentives:  juries can be 
removed from the equation simply by making capital decision mak-
ing open-ended rather than fact-based, by making the decision to 
impose death a moral judgment rather than a legal conclusion.8  
 
 
 4 Ring, 536 U.S. at 612–13 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“What today’s decision says is that the 
jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed.  Those States 
that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do so—by re-
quiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentencing phase or, more simply, 
by placing the aggravating-factor determination (where it logically belongs anyway) in the 
guilt phase.”). 
 5 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the task of estab-
lishing a “methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has 
been, to say the least, elusive.”  Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (citing Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Baumgartner v. United 
States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944)); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 408 (2000) (ac-
knowledging that it is “difficult to distinguish a mixed question of law and fact from a 
question of fact”). 
 6 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 237 (1985) 
(“[I]t seems misguided to assume, as many courts apparently do, that all law application 
judgments can be dissolved into either law declaration or fact identification.”). 
 7 See infra Part IV. 
 8 This reflects a peculiarly perverse incentive system because studies show that juries exer-
cise much more ownership and care over capital sentencing when it is open-ended or un-
constrained, as opposed to highly technical and legalized.  See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, How 
Sentencing Commissions Turned out to Be a Good Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 200–02 
(2007).  Because the strength of Ring’s jury mandate is inversely proportional to the 
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Such standardless decision making, while it currently passes constitu-
tional muster under the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,9 
remains constitutionally dubious.  We demonstrate that the malleabil-
ity of the capital sentencing process leaves the decision whether to 
impose death nearly unregulated by Ring and in need of a protective 
Eighth Amendment overlay.10  Stated another way, the role of the jury 
in capital sentencing is best realized not through the Sixth Amend-
ment, but through the Eighth Amendment. 
By examining the capital sentencing systems in four of the na-
tion’s most active death penalty states—Florida, Texas, California, 
and Georgia—we argue that the Sixth Amendment jury right, though 
of great importance in the non-capital context,11 tends to generate 
more confusion than protection in capital sentencing.  Nonetheless, 
the possibility of a meaningful jury right in the capital sentencing 
context need not be abandoned entirely.  In view of the shortcomings 
of the Sixth Amendment in this realm and in light of the retributive 
purpose underlying modern capital punishment,12 the wisdom of Jus-
 
amount of jury discretion, the jury right has the least force when it would be most effec-
tive. 
 9 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875–76 n.13 (1983) (stating that the Court’s decision 
in Jurek v. Texas makes clear that “specific standards for balancing aggravating against mi-
tigating circumstances are not constitutionally required”). 
 10 Of course, the role of the Eighth Amendment as a procedural stop-gap in capital sentenc-
ing issues is not a novel proposition.  For the last forty years, the Court has recognized the 
role of the “cruel and unusual punishment clause” as providing a unique or additional 
protective procedural gloss to death penalty adjudications.  See, e.g., id. at 884–85 (noting 
that “because there is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible 
form of punishment, ‘there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case’” (quoting 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion))). 
 11 See, e.g., R. Craig Green, Apprendi’s Limits, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (2005) (de-
scribing Apprendi as the “landmark in modern sentencing law”); Joseph L. Hoffman, Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey:  Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 255 (2001) (noting the 
importance of Apprendi in reigniting the debate from the 1970s and 1980s regarding the 
extent to which a “legislature, consistent with constitutional requirements, [can] shift the 
burden of persuasion in a criminal case” by simply redefining an element as a defense). 
 12 We believe that the Court’s capital sentencing jurisprudence rests on a strongly, if not 
exclusively, retributive rationale.  See Russell Dean Covey, Exorcising Wechsler’s Ghost:  The 
Influence of the Model Penal Code on Death Penalty Sentencing Jurisprudence, 31 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 189, 226 (2004) (“[S]everal Justices have expressly acknowledged that retri-
bution is the only supportable basis for the death penalty.”); cf. Baze v. Rees, 533 U.S. 35, 
90 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that even if capital punishment served no de-
terrent purpose, “the death penalty would yet be constitutional . . . if it served the appro-
priate purpose of retribution”). Efforts to prove a statistically meaningful deterrent have 
been inconclusive, and if there is any ambiguity as to the purposes of sentencing, there is 
good reason to default in favor of jury sentencing.  See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as 
Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 313 (2003) (“In the absence of wide consensus on 
sentencing goals, it is best to leave the sentencing decision with a deliberative democratic 
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tices Stevens13 and Breyer14 in locating a capital jury right in the 
Eighth Amendment has been dramatically under-appreciated.  Under 
their view of the Eighth Amendment, the role of the jury is crucial in 
capital sentencing not because of the jury’s fact-finding prowess, but 
because the jury plays an indispensable role in expressing the con-
science of the community.15  Recognizing an Eighth Amendment jury 
right is consistent with the Court’s general approach to capital sen-
tencing and better effectuates the jury-right promise of the Sixth 
Amendment than does the Sixth Amendment itself. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the relevant con-
straints on capital sentencing imposed by the Sixth and Eighth 
Amendments.  Part III applies these limits to four key death penalty 
jurisdictions and reveals the failure of Ring’s promised jury right.  In 
Part IV we conclude that the Eighth Amendment—rather than the 
Sixth—dictates that the uniquely democratic and retributive process 
of deciding who lives and who dies ought to be carried out not by a 
judge but by a jury. 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
Capital punishment in the United States is regulated by two dis-
crete but related Constitutional provisions:  the Eighth Amendment’s 
 
institution—the jury.”); id. at 328 (quoting the Federal Sentencing Commission’s admit-
ted inability to settle on a goal for punishment:  “Such a choice would be profoundly dif-
ficult.  The relevant literature is vast, the arguments deep, and each point of view has 
much to be said in its favor” (quoting Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch. 1, pt. A, 
introductory cmt. (1990))). 
 13 See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 526 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To permit the 
State to execute a woman in spite of the community’s considered judgment that she 
should not die is to sever the death penalty from its only legitimate mooring.”); Spaziano 
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 490 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (explaining that because the state did not persuade a jury of the petitioner’s peers 
“that death is an appropriate punishment for his offense[,]” the state had “authorized the 
imposition of disproportionate punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments”). 
 14 Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 360 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I believe the 
Eighth Amendment demands the use of a jury in capital sentencing because a death sen-
tence must reflect a community-based judgment that the sentence constitutes proper re-
tribution.”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I believe 
that jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated by the Eight Amendment.”).   
 15 Ring, 536 U.S. at 615–16 (“In respect to retribution, jurors possess an important compara-
tive advantage over judges. . . . [T]he jury remains uniquely capable of determining 
whether, given the community’s views, capital punishment is appropriate in the particular 
case at hand.”); see also Iontcheva, supra note 12, at 323 (tracing the history of the jury 
right and recounting the notion that it embodies “the ideal of a decentralized democra-
cy” insofar as juries are the “vehicle through which community concerns could be made 
to bear on important political decisions”). 
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prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Sixth 
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.  As this section makes clear, these 
two provisions exert competing pressures on states seeking to imple-
ment capital sentencing systems. 
A.  Capital Punishment Post-Gregg:  The Eighth Amendment Framework 
In 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia16 that 
the death penalty, as it was then being carried out across the coun-
try,17 was wanton and arbitrary, thereby violating the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments’ prohibition on cruel and unusual punish-
ment.18  Each of the Court’s nine Justices wrote an opinion in Furman, 
making the decision long on pages but short on discernible ratio-
nales.19  Two of the Justices asserted that the death penalty is never 
constitutional and four found no constitutional fault with the Geor-
gia statute directly at issue in the case.  Thus, the import of the deci-
sion derives primarily from the opinions of the three Justices, Potter 
Stewart, Byron White and William O. Douglas, who did not state ca-
tegorical objections to the death penalty, but rather found fault with 
the specifics of the Georgia statute.20 
These three Justices focused on the broad discretion permitted to 
capital sentencers by the Georgia statute.21  Justice Stewart stated that 
 
 16 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 17 Commentators have observed that “Furman had the effect of invalidating capital statutes 
passed by thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government.”  Carol 
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:  Reflections on Two Decades of Constitu-
tional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 362 (1995); see also id. at 362 
n.22 (noting that only Rhode Island’s automatic, non-discretionary death penalty survived 
after Furman). 
 18 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40 (1972).  Identifying the sentencing systems under review as 
arbitrarily assigning death, Justice Stewart memorably wrote, “These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening is cruel and unusual.”  
Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 19 Because the opinion of the Court was per curiam, the nine justices in Furman actually 
managed to produce ten separate opinions.  See id. at 240; see also Steiker & Steiker, supra 
note 17, at 362 (identifying Furman as the “longest decision ever to appear in the U.S. Re-
ports”). 
 20 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984) (summarizing these three justices’ rationales 
underlying their separate opinions in Furman); see also James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing 
with Death:  The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2007) (noting that Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White “controlled the outcome” of 
Furman). 
 21 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Under these laws no standards 
govern the selection of the penalty.  People live or die, dependent on the whim of one 
man or of 12.”); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he petitioners are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been 
 
534 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
death sentences imposed under the statute were “cruel and unusual 
in the same way that being struck by lightning [was] cruel and un-
usual;”22 the statute provides no guidance to the jury regarding how 
to determine a defendant’s sentence and thus results in random, un-
predictable, unprincipled death sentences.  The other Justices in this 
group were concerned by the possibility of racial discrimination that 
broad discretion permitted and by the relatively small number of 
death sentences actually imposed compared to the much larger 
number of murders occurring in Georgia.23  For these Justices, a con-
stitutional death penalty statute would require more rigorous, de-
fined, and fixed criteria for determining those cases for which death 
was the appropriate punishment. 
The states were sent back to the drawing board by Furman, forced 
to parse the opinions of Justices Stewart, White, and Douglas in order 
to determine what the Eighth Amendment required of them.  But it 
was not long before a majority of the Court was satisfied that the 
problems of arbitrariness found repugnant to the Eighth Amend-
ment in Furman had been remedied—Furman represents not the end, 
but the beginning, of the Supreme Court’s regulation of state capital 
sentencing regimes.  Less than four years after Furman had been 
handed down, the Court, in Gregg v. Georgia, upheld the new statute 
the Georgia legislature had passed in response to Furman.24  Although 
no definitive capital sentencing algorithm was mandated by the 
Court, the decision in Gregg, combined with separate opinions 
upholding the capital systems in Florida25 and Texas26 and rejecting 
the capital system of Louisiana,27 provided a set of guideposts for the 
states.  Read together, these decisions sketch a rough outline of the 
type of procedures that would, for Eighth Amendment purposes, suf-
 
imposed.”); id. at 314 (White, J., concurring) (stating that the legislature delegated sen-
tencing authority to juries and judges who exercised independent discretion). 
 22 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 23 Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring) (“[J]udges and juries have ordered the death penalty 
with such infrequency that the odds are now very much against imposition and execution 
of the penalty with respect to any convicted murderer or rapist.”).  Justice Douglas’ con-
curring opinion focused on racial disparities in capital sentencing.  Id. at 253–57 (Doug-
las, J., concurring). 
 24 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976).  Only the two absolutists, Brennan and Mar-
shall, dissented.  Id. at 227 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 230 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 25 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 26 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 27 Roberts v. Lousiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
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ficiently guide the sentencer’s discretion in assessing whether a de-
fendant should live or die.28 
On the same day that the Court expressly approved Georgia’s re-
vised capital sentencing system, however, the Court declared North 
Carolina’s capital system unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Caroli-
na.29  The relevant North Carolina statute mandated capital punish-
ment for all first degree murderers, and the Court held that this au-
tomatic death penalty statute was unconstitutional insofar as it denied 
the defendant the opportunity to have his individual characteristics 
considered by the sentencer.  The Court explained, “North Caroli-
na’s mandatory death penalty statute for first-degree murder departs 
markedly from contemporary standards respecting the imposition of 
the punishment of death and thus cannot be applied consistently 
with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’ requirement that the 
State’s power to punish ‘be exercised within the limits of civilized 
standards.’”30 
By the end of 1976, the Court had, through cases like Gregg and 
Woodson, essentially mandated that capital sentencing include two 
layers of narrowing:  the class of eligible persons must be narrowed to 
the most severe murderers,31 and there must be a further narrowing 
such that only the most culpable of those individuals is sentenced to 
death.32  States seeking to impose the death penalty must navigate be-
 
 28 The procedures adopted to resolve the constitutional concerns raised in Furman, for the 
most part, track the Model Penal Code’s capital sentencing provisions.  Covey, supra note 
12, at 206–24. 
 29 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 30 Id. at 301 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).  It is notable that the Court 
imported the evolving standards of decency framework for proportionality review under 
the Eighth Amendment into the realm of pure proceduralism.  The Woodson rule ad-
dresses only the adequacy of the capital sentencing proceedings, and yet the Court ex-
pressly invokes “contemporary standards” as a gauge for the constitutionality of the pro-
cedure in question.  Id. 
 31 See, e.g., G. Ben Cohen et al., A Cold Day in Apprendi-Land:  Oregon v. Ice Brings Unknown 
Forecast for Apprendi’s Continued Vitality in the Capital Sentencing Context, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. ONLINE, at 6 (2009), http://www.hlpronline.com/Smith_HLPR_042409.pdf (de-
scribing narrowing as the process of filtering out all but “the most severe murders com-
mitted by the most culpable murderers”). 
 32 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (mandating individualized consideration before sentencing de-
fendants in capital cases); see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (stating that 
when considering sentencing a person to death, “the sanction imposed cannot be so to-
tally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffer-
ing”).  Justice Scalia has observed that the individuation requirements of Woodson and the 
eligibility requirements of Gregg serve the same narrowing function—these two rules de-
fine a unitary determination:  “Does this defendant deserve death for this crime?”  Walton 
v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 666 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added), overruled 
in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
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tween two Eighth Amendment requirements.  They cannot, under 
Furman, leave the sentencer the unfettered discretion whether to im-
pose the death penalty or not, and they cannot, under Woodson, re-
quire that the death penalty be imposed under certain circumstances.  
The task of complying with the dual procedural requirements of the 
Eighth Amendment has resulted in an ongoing dialogue between the 
states and the Supreme Court regarding the propriety of various sen-
tencing systems.33 
For his part, Justice Scalia has declared the task of complying with 
these twin goals to be impossible.34  Forced to choose between what 
he describes as contradictory commands to the states—make the 
death penalty difficult to impose and easy not to impose—Justice Sca-
lia decided that he could follow only one.  Reviewing the history of 
the two lines of cases, he could find constitutional support only for 
the Furman line and announced that he would no longer follow the 
rule created in Woodson and elaborated in Lockett v. Ohio:35 
[Our] jurisprudence contain[s] the contradictory commands that discre-
tion to impose the death penalty must be limited but discretion not to 
impose the death penalty must be virtually unconstrained . . . . I would 
not know how to apply [Woodson]—or, more precisely, how to apply both 
[Woodson] and Furman—if I wanted to.  I cannot continue to say, in case 
after case, what degree of “narrowing” is sufficient to achieve the consti-
tutional objective enunciated in Furman when I know that that objective 
is in any case impossible of achievement because of Woodson-Lockett.  And 
I cannot continue to say, in case after case, what sort of restraints upon 
sentencer discretion are unconstitutional under Woodson-Lockett when I 
know that the Constitution positively favors constraints under Furman.  
Stare decisis cannot command the impossible.  Since I cannot possibly be 
 
 33 Since 1976, the Court has been “involved in the ongoing business of determining which 
state schemes could pass constitutional muster,” a process that has been described by 
some commentators as the Supreme Court’s “regulatory role” in the field of capital pu-
nishment.  Steiker & Steiker, supra note 17, at 363. 
 34 Notably, Justice Scalia’s pronouncement that he will now only apply one of the Eighth 
Amendment’s two procedural requirements arose in a case that represents the Court’s 
last decision affirming the principle that the Sixth Amendment does not require jury in-
volvement in any stage of capital sentencing.  Walton, 497 U.S. at 656–57 (Scalia, J., con-
curring).  Not long after Walton was decided, the Court revisited the Sixth Amendment is-
sue and reversed itself.  See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).  Justice Scalia, 
however, has not revised his position as to the Eighth Amendment protections during 
sentencing.  Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 35 Walton, 497 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., concurring).  In Lockett, the Court elaborated on the 
protections announced in Woodson.  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plural-
ity opinion). 
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guided by what seem to me incompatible principles, I must reject the one 
that is plainly in error.36 
For Scalia, the two sets of requirements—that sentencing discretion 
be suitably narrowed through rules and that all available evidence re-
levant to mitigation be admitted for consideration by the sentencer—
were simply irreconcilable.37 
In short, the Eight Amendment is sufficiently complicated on its 
own to make determining the constitutionality of any state’s capital 
sentencing provision unclear.  There is substantial disagreement 
about the role of Woodson’s mandate that individual characteristics of 
the accused—mitigation—be considered as part of the capital sen-
tencing proceeding and disagreement over what it means for a state 
to meaningfully narrow the pool of murderers to those who are ulti-
mately eligible for death.  These difficulties are exponentially com-
pounded, however, by the fact that capital sentencing proceedings 
are also regulated by the Sixth Amendment jury right.  Although the 
Court has squarely addressed, in Ring, the relationship between Fur-
man’s Eighth Amendment requirements and those requirements of 
the Sixth Amendment, it has not yet untangled the relationship be-
tween Woodson’s additional requirements and the Sixth Amend-
ment.38 
 
 36 Walton, 497 U.S. at 668, 673 (Scalia, J., concurring).  For a critique of this view, see Scott 
E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox:  Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in 
Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1206 (1991) (“[W]hile the cases necessitate dif-
ferent approaches to sentencer discretion, Furman narrowing it and Lockett expanding it, 
they share the goal of identifying which defendants are within the state’s power to ex-
ecute under the [E]ighth [A]mendment.”). 
 37 Given Scalia’s generally robust notion of the Sixth Amendment jury right, perhaps his 
explicit rejection of the need for broad individualizing or mitigation review, as a matter 
of Eighth Amendment doctrine, has tainted his view as to whether such review warrants 
the Sixth Amendment jury protections.  Given that he does not recognize a right to have 
one’s sentence individualized under Woodson, it is not terribly surprising that he has 
groused that the jury right does not attach to this right.  See Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he unfortunate fact is that today’s judgment has nothing to do with 
jury sentencing.  What today’s decision says is that the jury must find the existence of the 
fact that an aggravating factor existed.”).  On the other hand, given that Scalia has recog-
nized that aggravators and mitigators are doing the same constitutional work—narrowing 
the class of death-eligible defendants—his differing treatment of the two requirements 
for purposes of the jury right is incongruous. 
 38 At least for now, it seems clear that Justice Scalia has not prevailed in his quest to de-
constitutionalize the Woodson rule.  In recent years, the Court has repeatedly applied the 
requirement of broad, nearly unlimited admissibility principles regarding mitigation evi-
dence in capital sentencing proceedings.  See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 
233, 263–64 (2007) (reiterating that the Court has long held that before imposing a 
death sentence, the jury “must be allowed to consider a defendant’s moral culpability and 
decide whether death is an appropriate punishment for that individual in light of his per-
sonal history and characteristics and the circumstances of the offense”). 
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B.  Capital Punishment and the Sixth Amendment 
1.  The Tension Builds:  Developing a Coherent Sixth Amendment Theory 
for Capital Sentencing 
In Jones v. United States,39 the Supreme Court was asked to deter-
mine whether a provision of the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2119(2), dealing with serious bodily injury was an element of the 
offense or merely a sentencing factor.40  Under this provision, a suc-
cessful demonstration that the defendant had caused serious bodily 
injury during the course of his crime raised the potential punishment 
for carjacking from fifteen years to twenty-five years in prison.  The 
Court reasoned—citing the due process cases In Re Winship41 and Pat-
terson v. New York42—that the government must allege all the elements 
of an offense in the charging document43 and must prove them to a 
 
 39 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).  The relationship between sentencing factors 
and the Sixth Amendment jury right was first raised in a dissenting opinion by Justice Sca-
lia one year before Jones.  See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 738 (1998) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (“The fundamental distinction between facts that are elements of a criminal of-
fense, and facts that go only to the sentence provides the foundation for our entire double 
jeopardy jurisprudence . . . . The same distinction also delimits the boundaries of other 
important constitutional rights, like the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury . . . .”). 
 40 The section read, in its entirety, as follows: 
Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor ve-
hicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign 
commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by in-
timidation, or attempts to do so, shall— 
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or 
both, 
(2) if serious bodily injury . . . results, be fined under this title or impri-
soned not more than 25 years, or both, and 
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any 
number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death. 
  18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006). 
 41 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 42 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
 43 Although beyond the scope of this Article, the Fifth Amendment grand jury right, which 
produces the relevant charging document discussed in Jones, serves as yet another constitu-
tional protection that is implicated by the Eighth Amendment’s rules governing capital 
sentencing.  Capital sentencing implicates at least four distinct constitutional provisions:  
(1) the Eighth Amendment requirements of Furman and Woodson; (2) the Sixth Amend-
ment right to have a jury make findings of fact that increase one’s maximum sentencing 
range; (3) the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that elements be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the Fifth Amendment requirement that all elements 
be submitted to a grand jury.  Of these four, only the grand jury right to an indictment as 
to all elements has not been incorporated so as to apply to the states.  See United States v. 
Allen  406 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The indictment must include at least 
one statutory aggravating factor to satisfy the Fifth Amendment because that is what is re-
quired to elevate the available statutory maximum sentence from life imprisonment to 
death.  In turn, at least one of the statutory aggravating factors found by the petit jury in 
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jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Mere sentencing provisions, by con-
trast, need generally be proven only to a judge and only by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.44 
Reviewing the carjacking provisions at issue in Jones, the Court 
concluded that serious constitutional questions would be raised by 
accepting the government’s reading of the statute as specifying one 
offense with several sentencing factors.  Were the allegation of se-
rious bodily injury viewed merely as a sentencing factor, the Court 
reasoned, the jury’s role in the adjudication of a criminal defendant 
would be greatly eroded: 
The terms of the carjacking statute illustrate very well what is at stake.  If 
serious bodily injury were merely a sentencing factor under § 2119(2) 
(increasing the authorized penalty by two thirds, to 25 years), then death 
would presumably be nothing more than a sentencing factor under sub-
section (3) (increasing the penalty range to life).  If a potential penalty 
might rise from 15 years to life on a nonjury determination, the jury’s 
role would correspondingly shrink from the significance usually carried 
by determinations of guilt to the relative importance of low-level gate-
keeping:  in some cases, a jury finding of fact necessary for a maximum 
15-year sentence would merely open the door to a judicial finding suffi-
cient for life imprisonment.  It is therefore no trivial question to ask 
whether recognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize deter-
minations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite 
erosion of the jury’s function to a point against which a line must neces-
sarily be drawn.45 
To avoid these serious constitutional concerns, the Court con-
cluded that the statute was more accurately read as containing three 
separate offenses46—carjacking, carjacking with serious bodily harm 
resulting, and carjacking with death resulting—rather than one. Be-
cause the government had not alleged in the indictment47 or proven 
 
imposing the death sentence must have been one of the statutory aggravating factors 
charged by the grand jury in the indictment.”). 
 44 The Supreme Court recently reiterated this theme in United States v. O’Brien, 130 S. Ct. 
2169, 2175 (2010) (explaining that “subject to” the Sixth Amendment requirements, the 
question of whether a fact is an element or a sentencing factor is “a question for Con-
gress.  When Congress is not explicit . . . courts look to the provisions and the framework 
of the statute to determine whether a fact is an element or a sentencing factor”). 
 45 Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 243–44 (1999). 
 46 Id. at 251–52 (“Any doubt on the issue of statutory construction is hence to be resolved in 
favor of avoiding those questions.  This is done by construing § 2119 as establishing three 
separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements, each of which must be charged 
by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 47 Cf. Jane Eggers, Note, McKaney v. Foreman:  An Odd Departure from the Apprendi Line, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 403, 411–12 (2006) (explaining the implications of the Supreme Court’s 
Sixth Amendment cases discussing the indictment rule on states, which are not obligated 
to charge by indictment). 
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beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury the fact that Jones had caused 
serious bodily injury in the commission of a carjacking, his maximum 
sentence was properly determined by what was in fact proven to the 
jury, namely a violation of the baseline offense of carjacking.48 
In coming to the conclusion that the allegation of serious bodily 
injury was an element of the offense and not a mere sentencing fac-
tor, the Court was forced to distinguish three capital sentencing cas-
es—Spaziano v. Florida,49 Hildwin v. Florida,50 and Walton v. Arizona51—
which had all upheld the judge’s traditional role as a fact finder in 
sentencing.  Spaziano and Hildwin had both challenged Florida’s 
death penalty scheme that allows a judge, as the ultimate sentencer 
under Florida law, to disregard a jury’s recommendation of a life sen-
tence and impose the death penalty.  In Spaziano, the Court ruled 
that capital sentencing, like non-capital sentencing, is merely the 
process of choosing one alternative sentence over another, a task that 
has traditionally been one for the judge and not the jury.52  In the 
Court’s brief, per curiam decision in Hildwin, it rejected the idea that 
the findings that lead to death must be made by a jury; the finding of 
such sentencing factors, the Court reasoned, is a task traditionally left 
to the judge and not the jury.53  Finally, in Walton, the Court rejected 
the petitioner’s assertion that the findings that would make him 
death-eligible under Arizona law must be made by a jury; relying in 
part on Hildwin and Spaziano, the Supreme Court once again asserted 
that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the history of criminal sen-
tencing in the United States mandate a role for the jury in the fact 
finding that leads to an increased sentence.54 
 
 48 Jones, 526 U.S. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the result in Jones is governed by 
his “considered view” of the Sixth Amendment as announced in his Monge v. California 
dissent). 
 49 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
 50 490 U.S. 638 (1989). 
 51 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 52 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 458 (“Petitioner does not urge that capital sentencing is so much 
like a trial on guilt or innocence that it is controlled by the Court’s decision in Duncan v. 
Lousiana.” (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968))). 
 53 Hildwin, 490 U.S. at 640–41 (“Like the visible possession of a firearm in McMillan, the ex-
istence of an aggravating factor here is not an element of the offense but instead is ‘a sen-
tencing factor that comes into play only after the defendant has been found guilty.’  Ac-
cordingly, the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing 
the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.” (quoting McMillan v. Penn-
sylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)) (citations omitted)).  Notably, in McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia, the Court was not addressing a factual finding that increased the statutory maximum 
sentence.  See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 80–83 (1986). 
 54 See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647 (“Contrary to Walton’s assertion . . . ‘[a]ny argument that the 
Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings pre-
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The Court’s attempt to distinguish these three capital cases from 
its Jones holding is, at least in retrospect, difficult to comprehend.  If 
there is no constitutional infirmity in allowing a judge rather than a 
jury to find the facts that lead to death, why does allowing a judge to 
find that serious bodily harm resulted from a carjacking raise serious 
constitutional questions?  If the Jones Court were so concerned that a 
defendant might be sentenced to life without specific jury findings, 
why did it seem willing to allow a defendant to be sentenced to death 
based upon the findings of a trial judge sitting without a jury? 
Perhaps the answer lies in the Court’s concern that the carjacking 
statute, as read by the government in Jones, would allow the jury only 
a gate-keeping function; a jury verdict would merely make the defen-
dant guilty of a felony, but the ultimate seriousness of that felony 
would depend entirely on a judge’s determination of additional facts 
not heard—or perhaps even rejected—by the jury.  By contrast, in 
Florida, the jury determines whether or not the defendant is guilty of 
capital murder and the judge’s fact finding and conclusion as to the 
ultimate punishment is limited to the narrow, but important, choice 
between life and death.55 
Notwithstanding the obvious tension between the holding in Jones 
and the Court’s extensive capital sentencing jurisprudence, the Su-
preme Court famously reaffirmed and generalized the holding of 
Jones in Apprendi,56 holding that the Constitutional concerns that the 
Court raised in Jones were in fact quite substantial.57  Apprendi involved 
a hate crime allegation that doubled the maximum permissible pris-
on term for the weapons violation to which the defendant had 
pleaded guilty.  A judge sitting without a jury found the allegation of 
racial animus to be true to a preponderance of the evidence and sen-
tenced the defendant to a longer term of incarceration than he could 
 
requisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of 
this Court.’” (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990))). 
 55 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (2010) (“Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant 
of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to deter-
mine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment . . . .”).  
Under the federal statute, by contrast, to be eligible for the death penalty, an aggravating 
(eligibility) factor must exist above and beyond the capital murder itself.  18 U.S.C. § 
3593(e) (2010).    
 56 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (“Our answer to that question was fore-
shadowed by our opinion in Jones v. United States . . . .”). 
 57 Given the Court’s odd assertion in Jones that no one “today would claim that every fact 
with a bearing on sentencing must be found by a jury; we have resolved that general issue 
and have no intention of questioning its resolution,” Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 
248 (1999), Apprendi is perhaps no more than merely a consolidation of the holding in 
Jones. 
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have received for the charge in question based solely on the facts he 
admitted in his plea.  Apprendi, who had reserved his right to appeal 
the animus finding, did so, arguing that the fact that the hate crime 
allegation was found to be true by a judge rather than a jury deprived 
him of the rights guaranteed him by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.58 
Justice Stevens, writing for five Justices, reaffirmed the holding of 
Jones.  He quoted his own concurring opinion in that case for the 
proposition that:  “[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove 
from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed 
range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.  It is 
equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”59  The Court left intact its decision in Almendarez-
Torres v.United States60 that an allegation of a prior conviction was a 
sentencing provision and not an element of the crime (and thus, pre-
sumably did not need to be proved to a jury and beyond a reasonable 
doubt), but its opinion was otherwise categorical:61  other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the maximum possi-
 
 58 As a defendant in state court, Apprendi’s jury rights derived from the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (holding that citi-
zens cannot directly invoke the Bill of Rights against state governments); see also Jerold H. 
Israel, Selective Incorporation:  Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 317 (1982) (“[T]he states were to 
receive no greater deference for their judgments than the federal government.”); Justin 
F. Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights:  The Tension Between the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Federalism Concerns That Underlie Modern Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1251 (2008) (“There were not . . . any grounds for deferring to a 
state court’s application of a ‘lesser version of the same guarantee as applied to the Fed-
eral Government.’” (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346–47 (1963) (Doug-
las, J., separate opinion))). 
 59 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252–53 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)).  Justice Stevens also cited to Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in 
Jones.  Id. 
 60 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998) (“[T]he remaining McMil-
lan factors support the conclusion that Congress has the constitutional power to treat the 
feature before us . . . as a sentencing factor . . . .”). 
 61 The Court’s defense of Almendarez-Torres was hardly full-throated: 
Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, and that 
a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue 
were contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision’s validity and we need not 
revisit it for purposes of our decision today to treat the case as a narrow exception 
to the general rule we recalled at the outset.  Given its unique facts, it surely does 
not warrant rejection of the otherwise uniform course of decision during the en-
tire history of our jurisprudence. 
  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489–90 (footnotes omitted). 
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ble penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proved by the 
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.62 
In clarifying and expanding its Jones holding, the Apprendi Court 
was again obligated to distinguish apparently contradictory capital 
precedents.  Citing Walton—where the Court had upheld Arizona’s 
capital sentencing scheme under which the judge determined wheth-
er the facts that make the defendant eligible for death are true—
Justice Stevens argued that the reasoning of Jones and Apprendi did 
not prohibit a state from permitting a judge to find facts necessary to 
impose the penalty of death:  “this Court has previously considered 
and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision 
today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes requiring 
judges, after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty of a capital 
crime, to find specific aggravating factors before imposing a sentence 
of death.”63 
Why, exactly, the reasoning of Jones and Apprendi did not apply to 
capital sentencing was far from clear, however, as Justice O’Connor 
pointed out in her Apprendi dissent.  She argued that the distinction 
that the Court drew between Apprendi and Jones, on the one hand, 
and Spaziano, Hilbin, and Walton on the other, could not be main-
tained:  “[t]he distinction of Walton offered by the Court today is baf-
fling, to say the least.”64  As O’Connor read the Arizona statute at is-
sue in Walton, it did exactly what the Court rejected in the New Jersey 
hate crime statute: 
Under Arizona law, the fact that a statutory aggravating circumstance ex-
ists in the defendant’s case “increases the maximum penalty for [the] 
crime” of first-degree murder to death.  If the judge does not find the ex-
 
 62 Id. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 63 Id. at 496. 
 64 Id. at 538 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  As Justice Kennedy quite rightly pointed out dis-
senting in Jones, the standard that the Supreme Court has adopted for determining what 
questions must go to a jury seems custom-suited to overturning a case like Walton: 
If it is constitutionally impermissible to allow a judge’s finding to increase the max-
imum punishment for carjacking by 10 years, it is not clear why a judge’s finding 
may increase the maximum punishment for murder from imprisonment to death.  
In fact, Walton would appear to have been a better candidate for the Court’s new 
approach than is the instant case. 
  Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 272 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Of course, Kennedy 
and O’Connor were arguing that Jones and Apprendi were wrongly decided as inconsistent 
with the line of capital cases.  Their arguments, however, would lead to the overturning of 
the capital precedents as inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment cases. 
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istence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the maximum punish-
ment authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict is life imprisonment.65 
Justice O’Connor’s criticism, of course, was not of the Arizona sen-
tencing scheme but of the Court’s own Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence.66  For her, the traditional role of the judge in determining a 
defendant’s appropriate sentence was badly undercut by the Court’s 
blind adherence to a perceived Sixth Amendment principle. 
2.  The Sixth Amendment Cannot Be Home to Both 
The continuing tension between these two lines of Sixth Amend-
ment cases—capital cases upholding the power of a judge to make 
the findings of fact that make one eligible for death and non-capital 
cases requiring that every fact that leads to greater possible punish-
ment must be found by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt—came 
to a head in 2002 in Ring.67  In Ring, the petitioner challenged the 
very Arizona capital statute that the Court had upheld in Walton and 
reaffirmed in Apprendi.  The Arizona Supreme Court, in passing on 
Ring’s challenge of the state’s death penalty law, explicitly endorsed 
Justice O’Connor’s reading of the Arizona capital statute.68  Under 
 
 65 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 537 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Jones, 
526 U.S. at 243 n.6) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Ironically, the Court retorts by 
quoting Justice Scalia’s opinion dissenting in Almendarez-Torres for the proposition that 
“once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an offense which carries 
as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left to the judge to decide 
whether that penalty, rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.”  Id. at 497 (quoting 
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 257 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 66 The Arizona capital sentencing scheme described by Justice O’Connor is consistent with 
the Model Penal Code provision addressing capital punishment, § 210.6.  Compare Ap-
prendi, 530 U.S. at 536–37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (explaining that under Arizona law, 
a defendant can be sentenced to death only if the judge finds a statutory aggravating fac-
tor), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980) (“The determination whether sentence of 
death shall be imposed shall be in the discretion of the Court.  In exercising such discre-
tion, the Court shall take into account the aggravating . . . circumstances . . . .”).  Follow-
ing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976), which upheld a capital sentencing system 
based loosely on that endorsed by the Model Penal Code, most states embraced a similar 
approach. 
 67 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002). 
 68 See State v. Ring (Ring I), 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001) (en banc), rev’d,  536 U.S. at 548 
(2002) (“In Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of a jury’s 
verdict, regardless of the jury’s factual findings.  The range of punishment allowed by law 
on the basis of the verdict alone is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole or im-
prisonment for “natural life” without the possibility of release.  It is only after a subse-
quent adversarial sentencing hearing, at which the judge alone acts as the finder of the 
necessary statutory factual elements, that a defendant may be sentenced to 
death. . . . Therefore, the present case is precisely as described in Justice O’Connor’s dis-
sent—Defendant’s death sentence required the judge’s factual findings.” (citations omit-
ted) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.A-.E (2001))). 
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Arizona law, the state high court found, a defendant cannot be sen-
tenced to death unless a judge, sitting without a jury, determines that 
at least one aggravating circumstance has been proven true beyond a 
reasonable doubt.69  Although the Arizona court appeared to believe 
that the statute, properly interpreted, ran afoul of Apprendi, it re-
jected Ring’s Sixth Amendment challenge in light of the Supreme 
Court’s explicit reaffirmance of Walton in that very case.70 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Ari-
zona statute, as interpreted by the state high court, ran afoul of the 
Sixth Amendment as read by the Jones and Apprendi Courts.71  Echoing 
the opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court, the United States Su-
preme Court rightly noted that once a capital defendant had been 
convicted of capital murder in Arizona, the most serious punishment 
he can receive is life without parole; he does not become eligible for 
death until at least one aggravating factor is found.  Because Arizona 
law calls for this finding to be made by a judge sitting without a jury, 
the Arizona statute ran afoul of the Court’s opinion in Apprendi.  In a 
memorable phrase, Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court:  “we hold 
that Walton and Apprendi are irreconcilable; our Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence cannot be home to both.  Accordingly, we overrule 
Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a 
jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of 
the death penalty.”72 
As he would again in United States v. Booker,73 Justice Breyer at-
tempted in his concurrence to soften Ring’s blow.  Breyer, who did 
 
 69 Id.  Apprendi recognizes that the jury right is a “companion” to the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard of proof under Winship.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (“Equally well founded 
is the companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”).  Accordingly, after Ring, the prosecutorial burden of proof as to an aggravator is 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Compare Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972) 
(“[T]he Sixth Amendment itself has never been held to require proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt . . . .”), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (describing the Sixth Amendment jury 
protection as “the companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt” (emphasis added)), and Priya Nath, Case Note, Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania 123 S. Ct. 
732 (2003), 15 CAP. DEF. J. 419, 422 (2003) (“[T]he Ring Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment requires a jury to find the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reason-
able doubt.”). 
 70 Ring I, 25 P.3d at 1152 (concluding that Walton is the controlling authority). 
 71 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. 
 72 Id. 
 73 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Although Justice Breyer dissented from the 
Court’s holding that the federal sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional, he ma-
naged to exert substantial influence over what is now considered the Booker rule because 
his opinion regarding the proper remedy commanded a five Justice majority.  See id. at 
258–59 (setting out the three-part rule which lays out what portions of the statute are to 
be retained); see also Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker:  Advisory Guidelines in the Feder-
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not join Justice Ginsberg’s majority opinion, began by expressing his 
continued disapproval of the Court’s decision in Apprendi.  He con-
curred in the result, however, because he believed that the jury’s role 
in capital cases is mandated by the Eighth Amendment rather than 
the Sixth:  “the Eighth Amendment requires individual jurors to 
make, and to take responsibility for, a decision to sentence a person 
to death.”74  For Justice Breyer, therefore, the heightened due process 
required in capital cases necessarily includes a determination by the 
jury whether retribution requires the imposition of a sentence of 
death against the defendant; only retribution, Breyer argued, could 
justify the imposition of a sentence of death rather than some lesser 
punishment, and only a jury was properly situated to determine 
whether society’s ultimate punishment is justified in a particular 
case.75 
Justice Scalia, who did join the majority opinion, also concurred 
separately largely to make clear his disagreement with Justice Breyer’s 
understanding of the basis for the Court’s opinion: 
While I am, as always, pleased to travel in Justice Breyer’s company, the 
unfortunate fact is that today’s judgment has nothing to do with jury sen-
tencing.  What today’s decision says is that the jury must find the exis-
tence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed.  Those States that 
leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge may continue to do 
 
al System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 346 (2006) (examining “Justice Breyer’s remedial opi-
nion”).  The softening that occurred at the hands of Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion is 
somewhat hard to grasp; the remedy for a sentencing under an unconstitutional system of 
federal sentencing guidelines was to declare the entire guideline system advisory.  See 
Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 410 (2006) (describing 
the Booker remedy as greatly enhancing judges’ discretion at sentencing).  Of course, the 
sort of far-reaching discretion permitted (and mandated) after Booker is not permissible 
in the Eighth Amendment capital sentencing context.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 256–57 (1972) (“[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their opera-
tion.”).  Thus, a faithful application of the Ring jury-right to capital sentencing might pro-
vide capital defendants with the benefits of the Apprendi line of cases, without the oft 
complained of arbitrariness of the Booker remedy. 
 74 Ring, 536 U.S. at 619 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Notably, the argument that the Eighth 
Amendment requires jury sentencing in capital cases was not even advanced by counsel 
for the defendant in cases like Spaziano.  See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 458 (1984) 
(“Petitioner points out that we need not decide whether jury sentencing in all capital cas-
es is required; this case presents only the question whether, given a jury verdict of life, the 
judge may override that verdict and impose death.”). 
 75 Ring, 536 U.S. at 615–16 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[Jurors] are more likely to ‘express the 
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death,’ and better able 
to determine in the particular case the need for retribution, namely, ‘an expression of 
the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to hu-
manity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.’” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
510, 519 (1968))). 
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so—by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentenc-
ing phase or, more simply, by placing the aggravating-factor determina-
tion (where it logically belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.  There is really 
no way in which Justice Breyer can travel with the happy band that reach-
es today’s result unless he says yes to Apprendi.  Concisely put, Justice 
Breyer is on the wrong flight; he should either get off before the doors 
close, or buy a ticket to Apprendi-land.76 
The disagreement between Justices Scalia and Breyer in Ring, 
therefore, comes down to nothing less than a determination of what 
the jury right entails in capital cases and from where in the Constitu-
tion this right derives.  Is the jury guarantee merely about a defen-
dant’s right to have the facts that condemn him found by a jury, or is 
it a more robust “death is different” rule based in the jury’s role as 
moral conscience of the community?  As the following sections reveal, 
Justice Scalia’s view—that Ring is merely about fact finding—has 
largely carried the day.  We demonstrate the negative consequences 
of the triumph of the Justice Scalia’s reading and encourage the 
Court to give more credence to Justice Breyer’s reading in order to 
realize the promise of the jury’s role in capital sentencing. 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S CAPITAL 
SENTENCING REQUIREMENTS IN LIGHT OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT JURY 
RIGHT 
A.  The Capital Sentencing Landscape Today 
The buildup to Ring saw the Supreme Court ironing out the ten-
sions between its non-capital Sixth Amendment decisions—which 
trumpeted the role of the jury—and its Eighth Amendment capital 
decisions—which largely minimized the jury’s role in sentencing.77  
Whereas Jones and Apprendi were content to allow questions of capital 
 
 76 Id. at 612–13 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Sundby, supra note 36, at 1148 (explaining 
that Justice Scalia finds the principles of guided discretion and individualized considera-
tion to be in conflict with each other). 
 77 Indeed, in the Eighth Amendment context, the Court has affirmatively celebrated the 
role of the judge over the jury in sentencing on several occasions.  Compare Maynard v. 
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363–64 (1988) (holding that Oklahoma’s statutory standard for 
applying the death penalty was too vague), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432–33 
(1980) (holding that Georgia’s statutory factors did not help judges or jurors avoid arbi-
trary death sentences), with Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (“When a jury is 
the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all fa-
cets of the sentencing process. . . . But the logic of those cases [Godfrey v. Georgia and 
Maynard v. Cartwright] has no place in the context of sentencing by a trial judge.  Trial 
judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions.”), over-
ruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
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sentencing to be governed exclusively by the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, Ring made clear that 
the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence must accommodate its 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence (rather than vice versa).  However, 
the recognition that capital sentencing must comport with the dic-
tates of the Sixth Amendment was only half a victory for criminal de-
fendants; clarifying what, exactly, the Sixth Amendment means in the 
capital punishment context remains no easy feat. 
Here’s what we do know:  the Supreme Court currently reads the 
Eighth Amendment as imposing two distinct procedural protections 
designed to narrow the class of persons who will be sentenced to 
death and ensure that meaningful distinctions are made between 
those defendants who will live and those who will be executed:  (1) 
the states must have a process for measuring the relative aggravation 
of the offences; and 2) the trier of fact in a capital case must consider 
any factor relevant to the particular defendant’s culpability so as to 
limit the class of persons eligible for the ultimate penalty.78  These are 
the twin requirements of the Gregg and Woodson lines of cases, the re-
quirements that Justice Scalia argued could not be reconciled with 
one another.  And the states, in attempting to comply with these twin 
requirements, have constructed similar, but subtly varied, death pe-
nalty statutes. 
With regard to the first of these requirements—the making of 
meaningful distinctions—states generally ask juries to determine 
whether one or more aggravating factors are present:  whether the 
crime was committed for pecuniary gain, whether it involved the in-
tentional infliction of great pain, whether it involved multiple or vul-
nerable victims, etc.79  Knowing that they may neither impose the 
 
 78 The Court has never held that these two requirements alone are sufficient to comply with 
the Eighth Amendment requirement of procedural regularity and fairness.  Indeed, in 
upholding the capital sentencing systems of various states in Gregg and the accompanying 
cases, the Court seemed to recognize that each state’s “peculiar mix of procedural protec-
tions,” considered in the aggregate, was sufficient to comply with the Eighth Amendment.  
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 17, at 363.  The Court emphasized, for example, the impor-
tance of channeling sentence discretion and proportionality reviews as distinct and sepa-
rate requirements from the narrowing rules imposed by Gregg and Woodson.  Id. at 363, 
379 (explaining that among other procedural requirements that seemed essential to the 
Eighth Amendment in the wake of Gregg, the Court has “emphatically disclaimed any sep-
arate requirement to channel discretion”).  Likewise, the Court admitted that it no long-
er requires proportionality review in all cases.  See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50–51 
(1984) (“There is thus no basis in our cases for holding that comparative proportionality 
review by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death penalty is im-
posed and the defendant requests it.”). 
 79 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(1)-(14) (2010) (“No death penalty or sentence 
of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall be imposed but upon a un-
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death penalty on all murderers nor leave the question of which mur-
derers are most deserving of death to the unfettered discretion of a 
trier of fact, the states have followed the lead of the Model Penal 
Code’s capital provisions, using aggravating circumstances to deter-
mine death eligibility.80  There is little unanimity regarding exactly 
what factors make a defendant death-eligible, however, and the Su-
preme Court has spent a good part of the last thirty-five years deter-
mining the constitutionality of the varied aggravating factors used by 
the nation’s death penalty states.81 
With regard to the second of the Supreme Court’s Eighth 
Amendment requirements—that triers of fact consider any factor that 
the defendant believes to be mitigating of his culpability—the states 
also follow similar if slightly divergent paths.  They generally ask triers 
of fact to consider any proffered mitigating evidence against the gov-
ernment’s case in aggravation and to determine whether, on balance, 
the evidence supports a punishment of life imprisonment or death.82  
 
animous finding that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of 
one (1) or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which are limited to the fol-
lowing . . . .”). 
 80 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980) (listing various aggravating factors that courts and 
juries should consider in contemplating whether to sentence death).  As one commenta-
tor has observed, “The MPC approach did not initially attract much political support, but 
in the wake of . . . Furman v. Georgia, . . . the MPC’s approach has essentially become the 
law of the land in jurisdictions that continue to use the death penalty.”  Gerard E. Lynch, 
Revising the Model Penal Code:  Keeping It Real, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219, 232 (2003).  In 
2009, the American Law Institute (ALI) withdrew its support of the Model Penal Code 
death penalty provision and Michael Traynor, President Emeritus of the ALI, has called 
this “a striking repudiation from the very organization that provided the blueprint for 
death penalty laws in this country.”  Michael Traynor, Opinion, The Death Penalty—It’s 
Unworkable, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/04/
opinion/la-oe-traynor4-2010feb04 (discussing the difficulties of imposing a fair death pe-
nalty system). 
 81 See Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432 (holding that a provision of the Georgia Code permitting the 
imposition of the death penalty if the offense is “wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied); see also Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361–62 (concluding 
that the analysis of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances differs from the Due 
Process Clause approach to vagueness). 
 82 The cumulative breadth of the available aggravating (eligibility) factors in many states has 
led commentators to conclude that the narrowing function of aggravating factors, as re-
quired by Furman, has been effectively negated.  See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravat-
ing and Mitigating Factors:  The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment 
Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 348–49 (1998) (arguing that the aggregate effect 
of so many aggravating factors is to eliminate any meaningful narrowing function, and 
concluding that only a mandatory death penalty system would actually eliminate the arbi-
trariness concerns raised in Furman); id. at 356–57 (suggesting that the Court no longer 
takes seriously the requirement that death sentences not be arbitrary); Steiker & Steiker, 
supra note 17, at 374 (identifying a key failure of the use of aggravators for narrowing as 
the Court’s failure to place any “outer limit on the number of aggravating factors that a 
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While the states can be roughly categorized into weighing states—
which limit the factors that may be considered in aggravation—and 
non-weighing states—which do not place limits on the factors consi-
dered in aggravation—there is a fair amount of variation in how the 
states ask triers of fact to engage in this balancing.83  In considering a 
variety of state selection schemes, the Supreme Court has held that 
the Eighth Amendment does not require any one particular means of 
balancing aggravating and mitigating factors.84 
B.  The Sixth Amendment Jury Right in Four Representative States 
While the Supreme Court has held that many state sentencing re-
gimes pass Eighth Amendment scrutiny, this section is concerned 
with whether the Sixth Amendment jury right is implicated in lesser 
or greater ways by the states’ diverse approaches to determining the 
ultimate sentence in a capital case.85  The Supreme Court has been 
 
state may adopt.  Thus, even if a state adopts aggravating factors that, taken individually, 
meaningfully narrow the class of the death-eligible, the factors collectively might render 
virtually all murderers death-eligible”). 
 83 There is significant confusion regarding the proper meaning of these categories; howev-
er, for our purposes, the distinction is not material.  For what it is worth, the Court has 
identified Mississippi as a paradigmatic example of a weighing state because it is a state 
where the aggravators or eligibility factors, and only these factors, are weighed against the 
applicable mitigating evidence to assess whether a death sentence is permissible.  Brown 
v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 217–18 (2006) (“We identified as ‘weighing State[s]’ those in 
which the only aggravating factors permitted to be considered by the sentencer were the 
specified eligibility factors.”).  The two pans of the scale, then, are weighted with discrete 
and limited categories of evidence—on the mitigation side is whatever evidence was ad-
mitted in mitigation during the penalty phase and on the aggravation side are only the 
factor or factors found in aggravation at the eligibility stage of the proceeding.  By con-
trast, the Court has explained that a non-weighing state is a state that permits the sen-
tencer to balance against the applicable mitigation evidence any relevant evidence in ag-
gravation, not just the proven eligibility or aggravating factors.  Id.; see also John H. Blume 
et al., Probing “Life Qualification” Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 
1225–28 n.68 (2001) (denoting the differences between “weighing states” and “non-
weighing states”).  Accordingly, the distinction between weighing and non-weighing lies 
not in whether weighing occurs, but in what is weighed. 
 84 See, e.g., Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175 (2006) (“[W]e have never held that a specific 
method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceed-
ing is constitutionally required.  Rather, this Court has held that the States enjoy a consti-
tutionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death penalty.” (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The distinction between weighing and non-
weighing, though not of constitutional significance in itself, is of considerable importance 
when, on appeal, an aggravating factor is deemed invalid.  Compare Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (addressing the problem in the context of a non-weighing state), 
with Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990) (addressing the problem in the con-
text of a weighing state). 
 85 The balancing phase, as the term is used in this Article, refers to that portion of the sen-
tencing proceeding where a defendant has already been deemed “eligible” for a death 
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largely silent on this point since Ring, and the lower courts are gener-
ally divided as to the scope of Ring’s protections during the sentenc-
ing phase of capital trials.86  We examine the Sixth Amendment im-
plications in four states—Florida, Texas, California and Georgia—
that are notable both as very active death penalty states87 and as states 
with sentencing systems that illustrate the unanswered constitutional 
questions that remain so many years after Ring. 
1.  Florida 
Consider, first, the capital statute of Florida, a statute that the Su-
preme Court, prior to Ring, found on multiple occasions complies 
with the dictates of the Eighth Amendment.88  The Florida statute be-
 
sentence based on the finding of one or more aggravating factors and the question is 
whether the evidence in mitigation outweighs the evidence in aggravation. 
 86 Compare United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Appren-
di/Ring rule should not apply here because the jury’s decision that the aggravating factors 
outweigh the mitigating factors is not a finding of fact.  Instead, it is a ‘highly subjective,’ 
‘largely moral judgment’ ‘regarding the punishment that a particular person de-
serves . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 
n.7 (1985))), and United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he 
weighing of aggravators and mitigators does not need to be ‘found.’”), and United States 
v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 346 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not require a 
jury to be instructed that it must find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating 
factors beyond a reasonable doubt.”), and State v. Barker, 809 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind. 
2004) (“[T]here is no constitutional requirement that the weighing factor be found 
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”), and Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind. 2004) 
(“Neither federal constitutional doctrine under Apprendi and Ring nor Indiana state juri-
sprudence leads to the requirement that weighing be done under a reasonable doubt 
standard.”), and Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1158 (Md. 2003) (“[T]he weighing process 
never was intended to be a component of a ‘fact finding’ process . . . .”), and State v. 
McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257, 264 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (upholding a judge’s imposition 
of the death sentence after the jury was deadlocked regarding whether the mitigating 
evidence did not outweigh aggravating evidence), with Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460 
(Nev. 2002) (concluding that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors is “in 
part a factual determination”), and William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters:  An 
Empirical Examination of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Deci-
sion-Making, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 940 (“The rationale of Ring would seem . . . to 
require that jurors decide the relative weight or sufficiency of aggravating and mitigating 
factors.”). 
 87 See Michael Mello, Certain Blood for Uncertain Reasons:  A Love Letter to the Vermont Legislature 
on Not Reinstating Capital Punishment, 32 VT. L. REV. 765, 818 (2008) (calling Texas the 
“buckle of the death belt”); id. at 784 (noting that both Georgia and Florida are “active 
capital punishment states”); id. at 804 (asserting that California has the “largest death 
row . . . in the western hemisphere”). 
 88 See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462–63 (1984) (concluding that a death sentence 
need not be imposed by a jury); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958 (1983) (asserting 
that individualized determinations on the imposition of the death penalty are permissi-
ble); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976) (rejecting the argument that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty under any circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment). 
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gins with a straightforward weighing procedure, but adds a twist that 
has serious Sixth Amendment implications.  Florida Statute Section 
775.082 states that: 
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be pu-
nished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according 
to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court 
that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall 
be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole.89 
Section 921.141 provides for a sentencing hearing to be held be-
fore the trial court.  At the end of the sentencing hearing, the jury is 
to determine:  “whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist;”90 
“whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist” to outweigh the 
 
 89 FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (2010). 
 90 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2) (2010).  The statute lists the following aggravating factors: 
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person previously convicted of a 
felony and under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control or 
 on felony probation. 
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of 
a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. 
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many per-
sons. 
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or 
was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit, any:  robbery; sexual battery; aggravated 
child abuse; abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult resulting in great bodily 
harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement; arson; burglary; kidnap-
ping; aircraft piracy; or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive 
device or bomb. 
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or pre-
venting a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. 
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. 
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exer-
cise of any  governmental function or the enforcement of laws. 
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
(i) The capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, calcu-
lated, and  premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justifica-
tion. 
(j) The victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged 
in the per-formance of his or her official duties. 
(k) The victim of the capital felony was an elected or appointed public offi-
cial engaged in the performance of his or her official duties if the motive for the 
capital felony was related, in whole or in part, to the victim’s official capacity. 
(l) The victim of the capital felony was a person less than 12 years of age. 
(m) The victim of the capital felony was particularly vulnerable due to ad-
vanced age or disability, or because the defendant stood in a position of familial or 
custodial  authority over the victim. 
(n) The capital felony was committed by a criminal gang member, as de-
fined in s. 874.03. 
(o) The capital felony was committed by a person designated as a sexual 
predator pursuant to s. 775.21 or a person previously designated as a sexual preda-
tor who  had the sexual predator designation removed. 
  Id. § 921.141(5). 
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aggravating factors; and, “based on these considerations, whether the 
defendant shall be sentenced to life . . . or death.”91 
Up to this point, the statute resembles a classic, post-Gregg capital 
sentencing provision.  The state has enumerated certain aggravating 
factors and has made a finding of one of those circumstances a pre-
requisite to the imposition of the penalty of death.  This is also clearly 
a weighing statute—the aggravating factors found, and only those fac-
tors, are to be balanced against whatever mitigating evidence a de-
fendant has placed before the jury for its consideration. 
After requiring the jury to balance the eligibility factors against 
the mitigating factors, the Florida statute next commands a step that 
is a deviation from the procedures of most other weighing statutes 
and that brings the question of Ring’s applicability into sharp relief.  
For in Florida, the judge, rather than the jury, ultimately determines 
the defendant’s sentence: 
Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, 
after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter 
a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sen-
tence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the 
sentence of death is based as to the facts.92   
In other words, regardless of the decisions of the jury regarding 
the presence of aggravating factors and the extent to which they out-
weigh the case in mitigation, the trial judge is to re-balance these fac-
tors and determine anew whether death or life is merited. 
a.  Death Eligibility Under Florida Law 
Because of the role afforded to the judge in determining whether 
the defendant ultimately lives or dies, in Florida, the Ring question is 
more than merely rhetorical.  Recall that Ring requires that any fact 
that is necessary for the imposition of a sentence of death be found 
by a jury; if the second part of the Florida statute allows a criminal de-
fendant to be sentenced to death based upon judicial fact finding, 
then it runs afoul of Ring’s mandate.  In order to understand the ap-
plicability of the Sixth Amendment to Florida’s capital statute, there-
fore, it is necessary to determine what facts must be determined be-
fore an individual can be sentenced to death. 
Let us begin with the first question for the trier of fact:  whether a 
sufficient aggravating factor exists.  The determination is unquestion-
ably a factual conclusion that makes a defendant eligible for the 
 
 91 Id. § 921.141(2). 
 92 Id. § 921.141(3). 
554 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
death penalty.  In the absence of such a finding, the highest penalty 
that can permissibly be imposed upon a capital defendant is life in 
prison.  In this way, the Florida statue is operationally identical to the 
Arizona statute described in both Walton and Ring.  Accordingly, the 
plain language of Ring makes clear that the determination of an ag-
gravating factor must be made by a jury and beyond a reasonable 
doubt.93 
Despite Ring’s unambiguous, black-letter mandate that a jury 
make the factual finding with regard to the initial aggravating (eligi-
bility) factors, the Florida Supreme Court’s reading of its own statute 
appears to come to a different conclusion.  For example, in State v. 
Steele,94 the Florida high court rejected the use by a trial court of spe-
cial verdict forms in a capital sentencing hearing.  The trial court had 
ordered the advisory jury to fill out verdict forms in order to ensure 
that a majority of the jury agreed on the presence of at least one of 
the aggravating factors alleged.  The prosecution appealed this ruling 
and the Florida Supreme Court held that a majority vote with regard 
to any single aggravating factor was not required by Florida Law; in 
fact, it held that the use of special verdict forms would be error under 
the statute: 
Nothing in the statute, the standard jury instructions, or the standard 
verdict form, however, requires a majority of the jury to agree on which 
aggravating circumstances exist.  Under the current law, for example, the 
jury may recommend a sentence of death where four jurors believe that 
only the “avoiding a lawful arrest” aggravator applies, while three others 
believe that only the “committed for pecuniary gain” aggravator applies, 
because seven jurors believe that at least one aggravator ap-
plies. . . . Unless and until a majority of this Court concludes that Ring 
applies in Florida, and that it requires a jury’s majority (or unanimous) 
conclusion that a particular aggravator applies, or until the Legislature 
amends the statute . . . the court’s order imposes a substantive burden on 
the state not found in the statute and not constitutionally required.95 
This understanding of the jury right is irreconcilable with the Sixth 
Amendment for at least two independent reasons. 
 
 93 What is interesting about the Florida statute, however, is that it is not clear whether the 
jury’s finding of aggravating factors may be disturbed by the trial judge.  While the jury 
must determine whether sufficient aggravating factors exist and whether those factors 
outweigh the case in mitigation, the trial judge is given a more limited task; her role is li-
mited to weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors against one another.  See id.  Of 
course, not even this part of the statute is clear:  the same section states that a judge de-
termining that the defendant should be sentenced to death must “set forth in writing its 
findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts . . . [t]hat sufficient ag-
gravating circumstances exist.”  Id. 
 94 921 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2005). 
 95 Id. at 545–46 (citations omitted). 
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First, the passage quoted above demonstrates that although a find-
ing of an aggravating factor is clearly a prerequisite to the imposition 
of the death penalty in Florida, the state’s high court has refused to 
hold that Ring applies to such a finding.  In fact, the Court explained 
that Ring’s application, if any, to Florida’s capital sentencing scheme 
“remains unclear.”96  Stated another way, in Florida, a person might 
be sentenced to death although the jury fails to unanimously agree 
on the existence of a single aggravating factor; indeed, a sentence of 
death might be imposed even if the jury does not agree on the exis-
tence of any aggravating factors. 
Consider, for example, a case in which the jury recommends a 
sentence of life, but the judge rejects this recommendation and im-
poses a death sentence.97  This is no idle possibility:  “[b]etween 1972 
and early 1992, Florida trial judges imposed death sentences over 134 
juries’ recommendations of life imprisonment.”98  A jury’s rejection of 
the death penalty in such a case could mean one of two things:  ei-
ther the jury found no aggravators to be present or it found an aggra-
vator to be present but concluded that the case in mitigation out-
weighed the case in aggravation.  A judge’s rejection of the jury’s life 
verdict in the first alternative clearly violates Ring; aggravating factors 
are a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty and those 
factors must be found by a jury and not a judge.  If, however, the jury 
imposed life because it believes that aggravators were present but 
outweighed by the case in mitigation, the applicability of Ring is less 
 
 96 Id. at 540 (“Since Ring, this Court has not yet forged a majority view about whether Ring 
applies in Florida.”). 
 97 Proffitt v. Florida  428 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1976) (noting that the Florida Supreme Court 
has expressly approved the practice of imposing a sentence of death “following a jury 
recommendation of life” (citing Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975))); see 
Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[J]udges are far 
more likely than juries to impose the death penalty.  This has long been the case, and the 
recent experience of judicial overrides confirms it.  Alabama judges have vetoed only five 
jury recommendations of death, but they have condemned 47 defendants whom juries 
would have spared.”); see also Thompson v. State, 328 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1976) (noting 
judge-imposed death sentence despite jury recommendation of life); Douglas v. State, 328 
So.2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1976) (noting that judge imposed a sentence of death, finding “that 
there were no mitigating circumstances,” after jury recommended life sentence). 
 98 Harris, 513 U.S. at 521–22 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  It does not appear that there are 
any reported cases in Florida that reflect this factual scenario post-Ring.  See Inmate Legal 
Status, FLA. COMM’N ON CAPITAL CASES, http://www.floridacapitalcases.state.fl.us/c-
inmate-status.cfm#W (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (listing the present appellate status for 
each of Florida’s death penalty cases).  In this regard, Florida’s system is, as applied, not 
violating the core requirement of Ring, by stripping from the jury the very sort of fact 
finding at issue in Ring. 
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clear.99  The problem, of course, is that without a special verdict, a 
sentencing judge can never know for sure whether the jury found an 
aggravating factor.100  Consequently, although Florida’s advisory ver-
dict sentencing system is not facially unconstitutional, if a judge ig-
nores a life sentence returned by the jury and replaces it with a sen-
tence of death, Ring is violated.101 
We believe that Florida’s approach to eligibility facts is inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence for a 
second reason.  Because a mitigator, unlike an aggravator, does not 
make a defendant eligible for an increased punishment (death), it is 
not the kind of fact that needs to be found by a jury under Ring.  As a 
result, a number of states have concluded that the Sixth Amendment 
applies to findings of aggravators but not to findings of mitigators.  
There are other explanations for this disparate treatment, but one 
persuasive basis upon which state courts have distinguished aggrava-
tor findings from mitigator determinations is that findings as to miti-
gators do not require the sort of unanimity required of other substan-
tive criminal law elements.102  Explaining this distinction, the Arizona 
Supreme Court has emphasized that “each juror may vote for a sen-
tence of death—or against it—as each sees fit in light of the aggravat-
ing factors found by the jury and the mitigating evidence found by each 
juror.”103  Whereas elements and their functional equivalent, including 
eligibility factors, must be found by the jury as a whole, facts in miti-
gation do not require any consensus as to a particular mitigator, but 
rather require each individual juror to determine for herself whether 
a mitigator or set of mitigators was sufficiently substantial to justify a 
life sentence.104 
 
 99 We discuss the applicability of Ring to Florida’s selection process in the next section.  See 
infra Part III.B.1.b. 
100 Under Florida law, when the trial judge imposes a sentence of death, the judge must issue 
a written statement describing the circumstances, presumably including aggravating facts, 
that justify a sentence of death.  FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2010). 
101 Cf. Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1082 (1992) (per curiam) (holding that because a 
trial judge must give “great weight” to a jury’s advisory sentence, when the jury is in-
structed on an invalid eligibility factor, even though it is impossible to know whether the 
jury relied on that particular invalid aggravator, the death sentence imposed by the judge 
is invalid). 
102 See, e.g., Ex Parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 1190 (Ala. 2002) (distinguishing finding of 
mitigator from finding of element); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (Pa. 
2002) (holding that Pennsylvania law does not require the jury to find mitigators un-
animously, and holding jury instruction requiring jurors to all find the same mitigator 
prejudicial error). 
103 State ex rel. Thomas v. Granville, 123 P.3d 662, 665 n.3 (Ariz. 2005) (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 666. 
Mar. 2011] THE FACTS ABOUT RING V. ARIZONA 557 
 
The Florida sentencing system turns the logic of the Arizona high 
court’s approach on its head.  Under Florida’s system, the facts in ag-
gravation—which serve the role of an element by rendering one eli-
gible for greater punishment105—need not be found unanimously.  
Indeed, the Florida high court has held that a special verdict form 
specifying which, if any, eligibility factors were unanimously found is 
impermissible as a matter of Florida law.106  But if aggravators are 
functionally equivalent to elements, then the court’s conclusion in 
this regard—that a death sentence is permissible so long as a majority 
of the jury believes that some aggravating factor is present, even if a 
majority of the jury rejects each of the factors—is valid only if it would 
apply to the elements of an offense.  However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held just the opposite with regard to elements of an of-
fense:  a jury must be sufficiently unanimous107 as to each element.  
Thus, because eligibility factors are elements of a death sentence, 
they must be treated like elements with regard to unanimity.108 
 
105 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Appren-
di purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts re-
flected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”).  As Professor John Douglass has ob-
served, under “the language of Blakely, no judge—or jury for that matter—may impose 
death ‘solely on the basis of the facts reflected’ in the finding of death eligibility.”  John G. 
Douglass, Confronting Death:  Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1967, 2004 (2005). 
106 The Court also explained that such a system would be an “unnecessary expansion of 
Ring.”  State v. Steele, 921 So. 2d 538, 546 (Fla. 2005). 
107 Although most jurisdictions, including the federal system, require unanimous jury ver-
dicts, FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a), the Constitution does not require unanimous verdicts in 
state criminal trials.  See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410–12 (1972) (plurality opi-
nion) (reviewing a 10-2 conviction and concluding that the Sixth Amendment jury right 
does not require unanimity in state criminal trials); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 
362 (1972) (reviewing a 9-3 conviction and concluding that because a “substantial majori-
ty” of the jury voted to convict, due process was not violated). 
108 This aspect of Florida’s sentencing scheme could be salvaged if capital eligibility facts 
were regarded as “means” of establishing eligibility as opposed to elements of capital 
murder.  See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 637 (1991) (plurality opinion).  In a plurality 
with no clear narrowest grounds, the Court upheld a murder conviction that did not re-
quire the jury to be unanimous as to the “means”—i.e., premeditated or felony murder—
of the commission of the crime.  Id. at 631 (“We have never suggested that in returning 
general verdicts in such cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means 
of commission.”).  Setting aside the potential impact of changes of Court personnel on 
this badly fractured decision, there are at least three reasons that non-unanimity as to an 
aggravating factor is not easily understood as a natural extension of Schad v. Arizona:  (1) 
the Apprendi line of cases sought to end the sort of formalism that permits an element to 
be characterized as a mere sentencing factor, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 485 
(2000), and relabeling what Ring has called the functional equivalent of an element as a 
mere “means” of establishing capital eligibility seems to similarly exalt form over sub-
stance; (2) the Schad plurality expressly noted that due process imposes limits on the abil-
ity of a crime to be defined in terms of wildly divergent “means”; that is to say, a crime 
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b.  The Selection Decision Under Florida Law 
What, then, of the next question posed to the trier of fact under 
the Florida statute:  whether sufficient mitigating factors exist to justi-
fy the imposition of an indeterminate life sentence rather than a 
death sentence?  Is the absence of sufficient mitigation a “fact” that 
needs to be found by a jury or is it something else?  As to this ques-
tion as well, Florida has held that Ring does not apply.  A per curiam 
opinion with concurrences from all seven justices, Bottoson v. Moore109 
points out the struggles that the states have had in coming to terms 
with Ring’s mandate.  The part of the per curiam opinion discussing 
Ring reads, almost in its entirety, as follows: 
Although Bottoson contends that he is entitled to relief under Ring, 
we decline to so hold.  The United States Supreme Court in February 
2002 stayed Bottoson’s execution and placed the present case in ab-
eyance while it decided Ring.  That Court then in June 2002 issued its de-
cision in Ring, summarily denied Bottoson’s petition for certiorari, and 
lifted the stay without mentioning Ring in the Bottoson order.  The Court 
did not direct the Florida Supreme Court to reconsider Bottoson in light 
of Ring. 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has re-
viewed and upheld Florida’s capital sentencing statute over the past quar-
ter of a century, and although Bottoson contends that there now are 
areas of “irreconcilable conflict” in that precedent, the Court in Ring did 
not address this issue . . . .110 
 
cannot be so generic as to permit such disparate means as burglary or tax evasion, Schad, 
501 U.S. at 633.  If the Court is unwilling to accept a single crime with such generic 
means, the diversity of aggravating factors—pecuniary gain or future dangerousness, for 
example—strongly suggests that an aggravating factor must be regarded as an element 
that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury, Richardson v. Unit-
ed States, 526 U.S. 813, 820 (1999); and (3) some lower courts have suggested that 
double jeopardy does not prohibit one from being re-prosecuted for capital murder after 
a finding of insufficient evidence in the first trial when the second capital murder charge 
is supported by a new aggravator.  Powell v. Kelly, 562 F.3d 656 (4th Cir. 2009) (conduct-
ing federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).  In Powell v. Kelly, a defendant’s first 
capital murder conviction was overturned based on a finding of insufficient evidence re-
garding the aggravating factor supporting the death sentence.  Id. at 661.  When addi-
tional evidence was discovered that justified charging a separate aggravating factor, the 
defendant was re-prosecuted for capital murder based on this new aggravator.  Id.  This 
result strongly suggests that lower courts regard distinct capital aggravating facts as indi-
vidual elements.  Id. at 666 (accepting as reasonable the conclusion that “where there is a 
single murder victim accompanied by multiple” eligibility factors, double jeopardy does 
not bar a re-prosecution for capital murder based on a new eligibility factor); see also 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (finding that where two statutes 
each contain an element that the other does not, a single act can be found to violate both 
statutes without violating double jeopardy). 
109 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). 
110 Id. at 695 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
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The Florida court thus reasons that the U.S. Supreme Court had Bot-
toson’s claim before it at the time that it decided Ring and that the 
High Court’s refusal to grant certiorari in Bottoson’s case—even if 
just to vacate and remand to the Florida Court for reconsideration in 
light of the Ring decision—indicates the Supreme Court’s belief that 
Florida’s statute comports with the rule the Court created in Ring. 
Procedural issues to one side,111 this decision raises at least as many 
questions as it answers.  For example, the fact that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the Florida sta-
tute does not do the analytic work that the Florida Supreme Court 
seems to think that it does.  Each of the decisions it cites for that 
proposition was decided before 2002’s Ring decision, and these cases 
reviewed Florida’s capital system exclusively on Eighth Amendment 
grounds.112  To cite a number of decisions, all invoking the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, for the 
proposition that the capital statute complies with the Sixth Amend-
ment is nothing short of perverse.  What is more, the Court’s brief 
does not actually engage the merits of whether a finding of sufficient 
mitigating evidence is a finding of fact giving rise to Sixth Amend-
ment rights.113 
Nonetheless, despite the dearth of analysis in the Florida court’s 
opinion, it appears to be in line with most of the recent circuit court 
decisions on this issue.  For example, the Tenth Circuit has con-
cluded: 
[T]he Apprendi/Ring rule should not apply here because the jury’s deci-
sion that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors is not a 
finding of fact.  Instead, it is a “highly subjective,” “largely moral judg-
ment” “regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves. . . .”  
In death cases, “the sentence imposed at the penalty stage . . . reflect[s] a 
reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and 
crime.”  The Apprendi/ Ring rule applies by its terms only to findings of 
fact, not to moral judgments.114 
 
111 The Florida Supreme Court fails to recognize that a denial of certiorari is not a judgment 
on the merits and is not entitled to precedential effect.  See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 
288, 296 (1989) (“As we have often stated, the ‘denial of a writ of certiorari imports no 
expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.’” (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 
U.S. 482, 490 (1923) (Holmes, J.))).  The fact that the Supreme Court had stayed the 
case during the pendency of the Ring case only to deny certiorari after deciding it streng-
thens the Florida court’s reasoning, but only slightly. 
112 See, e.g., Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); 
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
113 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 693. 
114 United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) 
(quoting United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 346 (5th Cir.2007) (citations omitted)); see 
also People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1147 (Cal. 2003) (describing the sentencing process as 
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Similar reasoning also characterizes the forceful rejection of Ring’s 
application to balancing by the First Circuit: 
This [Ring] argument founders . . . because it assumes, without the sligh-
test support, that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors is a 
fact.  This assumption is incorrect.  As other courts have recognized, the 
requisite weighing constitutes a process, not a fact to be found.  The out-
come of the weighing process is not an objective truth that is susceptible 
to (further) proof by either party.  Hence, the weighing of aggravators 
and mitigators does not need to be “found.”115 
 Not all of the data points in that direction, however.  For example, 
the Nevada capital statute calls, in the event of a deadlocked jury, for 
a three-judge panel to make the determinations that would otherwise 
fall to the jury:  “[t]he jury may impose a sentence of death only if it 
finds at least one aggravating circumstance and further finds that there 
are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravat-
ing circumstance or circumstances found.”116  The Nevada Supreme 
Court held that it would violate Ring for a three-judge panel to make 
either of these findings in the absence of a jury. 
This second finding regarding mitigating circumstances is necessary to 
authorize the death penalty in Nevada, and we conclude that it is in part 
a factual determination, not merely discretionary weighing.  So even 
though Ring expressly abstained from ruling on any “Sixth Amendment 
claim with respect to mitigating circumstances,” we conclude that Ring 
requires a jury to make this finding as well:  “If a State makes an increase 
in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a 
fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”117 
In this regard, however, Nevada remains a significant outlier. 
Despite the fact that most courts that have considered the ques-
tion have determined that balancing is not a fact finding subject to 
Ring’s limitations,118 we believe that, as a categorical statement, this 
 
“inherently moral and normative, not factual” (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 726 P.2d 
113, 144 (Cal. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
115 U.S. v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
116 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.554(3) (Lexis Nexis 2009) (emphasis added). 
117 Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450, 460 (Nev. 2002) (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 
597 n.4 (2002)). 
118 Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1151 (Md. 2003) (explaining that “the weighing process is 
not a fact-finding [process]”).  Courts have variously expressed this stunted view of Ap-
prendi by concluding that weighing is “moral” rather than factual, Ex parte Waldrop, 859 
So. 2d 1181, 1189 (Ala. 2002), “normative, not factual,” Prieto, 66 P.3d at 1147 (quoting 
People v. Rodriguez, 726 P.2d 113, 144 (Cal. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and by referring to the weighing process as merely a forum “for the jury to give its subjec-
tive opinion as to whether the death penalty is appropriate,” State v. Whitfield, 107 
S.W.3d 253, 259 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (summarizing the prosecution’s argument, but ul-
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position is largely indefensible in light of the case law and scholarly 
literature regarding what constitutes a question of fact.119  Although 
the longstanding debate regarding which determinations are truly 
factual is beyond the scope of this paper,120 substantive criminal law’s 
applied definition of elements—those issues that must be left to a 
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt121—is sufficiently capa-
cious to include the balancing process as it is administered in most 
jurisdictions.  Particularly in a weighing state—where the jury is told 
what factors to place on both sides of the sentencing balance—
courts’ unwillingness to consider balancing to be a fact finding giving 
rise to Ring’s jury requirement seems deliberately short-sighted. 
To be sure, it is possible to define fact finding in terms of a purely 
descriptive account of what has already happened—the “who, when, 
what, and where.”122  Viewed in this light, the process of determining 
whether the facts in aggravation outweigh the facts in mitigation so as 
to justify a sentence of death in a particular case is an inherently non-
factual assessment.  However, such an approach to the fact/law di-
chotomy is needlessly formalistic and correspondingly irreconcilable 
with the way fact finding is generally viewed in the context of criminal 
 
timately rejecting this position).  The common thread seems to be that weighing cannot 
be regarded as a finding of fact because it is not sufficiently rigorous or delineated. 
119 To be sure, there is considerable debate about what constitutes a finding of fact as to 
some sort of mixed question of fact and law.  But it is anything but clear that a finding as 
to whether aggravators outweigh mitigators is patently classifiable under one category or 
the other.  For a discussion regarding the complexity of determining whether a particular 
question is one of fact, see generally Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review:  Question of Fact, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 1020 (1956). 
120 There is a long line of commentary addressing this question.  See, e.g., George C. Christie, 
Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 26–31 (1992); Ronald R. Hofer, 
Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231 (1991); Jaffe, supra 
note 119. 
121 The Court has repeatedly recognized that due process requires that “every fact necessary” 
for a conviction must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.  In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).  In Apprendi, the court explicitly linked the Sixth 
Amendment jury right to the due process beyond a reasonable doubt right.  Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–78 (2000).  Thus, Winship’s holding regarding the burden 
of proof for facts necessary for conviction is imported into Apprendi’s jury-right protec-
tions.  As commentators have observed, the Apprendi “controversy is almost an exact ref-
lection of [an] earlier one, with the primary differences being that the Court has re-
placed as its foci the proof requirement with the requirement of jury decisionmaking.”  
Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:  Constitutional 
Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 199 (2005). 
122 Monaghan, supra note 6, at 235; see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963) 
(“By ‘issues of fact’ we mean to refer to what are termed basic, primary, or historical facts: 
facts ‘in the sense of a recital of external events . . . .’” (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 506 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.))). 
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cases.123  Take, for example, the crime of negligent homicide.  The 
crime generally requires:  (1) that a person died; (2) that the defen-
dant acted negligently; and (3) that the defendant’s negligent actions 
caused the victim’s death.  The first fact, that the victim died, is ob-
viously an historical fact; it is either true or it is not.  However, the 
second two requirements—which unquestionably constitute the sort 
of “facts” that must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt—
necessarily require the jury to make some very non-factual, subjective, 
even moral assessments about the defendant. 
Consider, first, the question of whether an individual acted negli-
gently.  Although the negligence determination is clearly the sort of 
fact that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of 
fact, it is a determination that is inherently amorphous, normative, 
and moralistic.  In evaluating whether a defendant had sufficient cul-
pability to warrant criminal punishment, the law will instruct the jury 
to consider, for example, whether he “should [have been] aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk” that the prohibited harm would oc-
cur.124  Moreover, in assessing whether the defendant’s failure to 
perceive the risk was sufficiently culpable, the jury must assess wheth-
er the conduct was a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a 
reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”125  Obvious-
ly, this inquiry into whether a deviation from the ordinary standard of 
care is sufficiently “gross” and the “reasonableness” of the defen-
dant’s actions are not classic, or even readily identifiable, factual 
questions.  Such determinations bear no relation to historical or ob-
servable facts.  Nonetheless, such determinations are reserved for the 
jury alone.126 
 
123 It is fair to consider all “elements” of an offense as “factual.”  The Court requires “proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged.”  Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).  Commentators  have observed 
that the practical effect of Winship is that “the prosecution must prove all of the ‘elements 
of the offense’ beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Note, Winship on Rough Waters:  The Erosion 
of the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1993) (distinguishing be-
tween elements and affirmative defenses). 
124 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) (defining negligence). 
125 Id. 
126 Winship, 397 U.S. at 361; see also Monaghan, supra note 6, at 234 n.33 (“[T]hough the 
question of negligence may involve considerable norm elaboration, a function ordinarily 
performed by judges, the question has long been viewed as one for the jury.”).  Some 
have noted the confusion in treating negligence as ‘factual’ and argued that in reality 
“this task is neither factfinding nor law declaration,” and thus that clarity in the law would 
be best served by recognizing that “the allocation of negligence questions to the jury rests 
on grounds of policy, not on abstract conceptions of the intrinsic nature of the question 
itself.”  Id. at 232–33 n.22. 
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The question of whether the individual’s conduct was the legal 
cause of another’s death similarly defies tidy, factual categorization.127  
Indeed, the concept of causation has been characterized as a “purely 
normative question” masked with the legalistic label of “proximate 
cause.”128  Reviewing the Model Penal Code’s classic formulation of 
causation is illustrative:  a defendant is said to have caused a result if 
the harm is not “too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a 
just bearing on the actor’s liability.”129  While this conclusion is expli-
citly moral and judgmental, no court would consider taking it from a 
jury; it is an element of the offense and must be found by a jury and 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It seems both obvious and wholly unremarkable that if a court 
were to take either of these findings—negligence or causation—away 
from the jury and determine them as a matter of law, it would run 
afoul of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.  One simply 
cannot be said to be guilty of negligent homicide if a fact finder does 
not find that he was negligent.  Likewise, one is not eligible for the 
death penalty unless a fact finder determines both that certain aggra-
vating facts exist and that such aggravating facts outweigh any mitigat-
ing evidence introduced at sentencing.  Because these are the facts 
that make a defendant eligible for death, Ring requires that they be 
found by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Examples like negligence—and other nebulous legal concepts like 
obscenity130—explode the notion of factual purity espoused by the 
lower courts that have limited jury rights in capital sentencing.  There 
is no litmus test that recognizes all normative assessments as non-
factual—quite the contrary.  And given that Ring abolished the “line 
 
127 Cf. Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in Negligence Law:  Descriptive 
Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1039, 1069–70 (2001) (describing how restat-
ing negligence law could provide “clarity, certainty, and uniform application of the com-
mon law across the United States”). 
128 Id. at 1053. 
129 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.03(2)(b), (3)(b) (1985). 
130 Well beyond the simple negligence hypothetical, other examples of normative or moral 
judgments that are consistently and rightly regarded as sufficiently “factual” to trigger the 
jury protection abound.  Other examples include damage calculations, such as loss of fu-
ture earnings, see Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1995) (discussing 
the effect of disability on future wages); see also Shepard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 423 F.2d 
406, 410 (1st Cir. 1970) (reaffirming that “where the evidence justifies an inference of 
loss . . . the issue of damages for loss of earning capacity is for the jury”), questions as to 
whether one was reasonably provoked into the proverbial “heat of passion” based on 
“adequate” provocation, and, of course, questions regarding obscenity within a particular 
community, Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 292–96 (1977) (discussing at length the 
obscenity standard), and even questions of future dangerousness for purposes of pretrial 
or civil confinement. 
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between the fact finding in the guilt phase and the fact finding in the 
sentencing phase,”131 the confidence with which many lower courts 
have asserted that balancing does not implicate Ring is unsettling as a 
matter of doctrine, even if understandable as an administrative mat-
ter.132 
In short, careful definition of “fact finding” has always proven illu-
sory.  Commentators and courts have repeatedly lamented the ab-
sence of a meaningful method for distinguishing a normative or legal 
question from a factual one.133  Thus, the kind of conclusions re-
quired by the Florida capital statute—that aggravating factors exist or 
that they outweigh any mitigating evidence—simply cannot be blithe-
ly dismissed as moral or normative rather than factual. 
2.  Texas 
The second example we use to illustrate the confusion surround-
ing Ring’s application is the Texas capital sentencing system.134  In the 
 
131 Michael Antonio Brockland, Comment, See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil:  An Argu-
ment for a Jury Determination of the Emmund/Tison Culpability Factors in Capital Felony Mur-
der Cases, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 235, 235 (2007). 
132 Some studies suggest that juror involvement in capital sentencing is more, not less, likely 
to result in sentences of death.  See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by De-
fault:  An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 605, 716–17 (1999) (asserting that the pervasive misunderstanding among jurors 
that persons not given the death penalty will be released on parole leads to excessive ap-
plication of death as punishment); Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner:  Capital Ju-
ries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 777–94 (2006) (finding 
evidence showing that death qualification makes juries favor the prosecution on the ques-
tion of guilt).  Consequently, some have proffered that lower courts will want to fortify 
the option of states to employ judges as the final arbiters of capital sentences.  See Jill M. 
Cochran, Note, Courting Death:  30 Years Since Furman, Is the Death Penalty Any Less Discri-
minatory?  Looking at the Problem of Jury Discretion in Capital Sentencing, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1399, 1449–50 (2004) (arguing that states should be free to choose whether a judge is 
best suited to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate at the penalty phase); 
Benjamin Cooke, Note, Ring v. Arizona:  Unnecessarily Abandoning Judges Along the Winding 
Road of the Death Penalty, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 383, 383–84 (2003) (suggesting that states 
adopt a procedural rule granting judges some discretion in sentencing for a death penal-
ty case). 
133 Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 316, 319 (2004) (dis-
cussing whether facts pertaining to federal criminal sentencing should be viewed as “su-
perfacts”—something in between elements and sentencing factors); see also Baumgartner 
v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944) (stating that the scope of appellate review may 
differ depending on the type of “fact” in controversy); Monaghan, supra note 6, at 232–33 
(discussing the difficulty of characterization and its relevance in determining the appro-
priate scope of appellate review). 
134 Between 2000 and 2009, the state of Texas has executed between seventeen and forty per-
sons every year.  Executions, TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST., http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat 
/annual.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
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rush to adopt a capital sentencing regime that would comply with the 
mandates of the Eighth Amendment as announced in Furman, the 
Texas legislature adopted a provision conditioning death on a find-
ing of future dangerousness.135  In the run-of-the-mill Texas capital 
case, two questions are generally put to the jury in the capital sen-
tencing process:  “whether there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a con-
tinuing threat to society?”136  And then, if yes: 
Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the cir-
cumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, 
and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mi-
tigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole rather than a death sentence be im-
posed.137 
Texas, unlike most capital states, limits death eligibility to a single ag-
gravating factor; the only finding that can make a defendant eligible 
for the death penalty is his future dangerousness. 
a. Eligibility for the Death Penalty Under Texas Law 
While Texas is alone in its singular focus on future dangerousness, 
prediction of a defendant’s continuing threat to the community is a 
very important factor in capital sentencing nationwide.  Future dan-
gerousness is used as an eligibility or aggravating factor “in nearly 
every capital jurisdiction in the United States.”138  Even more striking, 
it is estimated as “underlying” more than half of all modern execu-
tions, and as “playing some role in the rest”; indeed, federal prosecu-
tors have been found to raise a future dangerousness claim in “77% 
of federal capital prosecutions.”139 
Although the Texas statute requires that the aggravating factor be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals—in a series of unpublished opinions—has repeatedly held that 
 
135 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West 2006).  In Jurek v. Texas, 428 
U.S. 262, 276 (1976), the Court upheld Texas’ system as complying with the requirements 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
136 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 37.071(2)(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
137 Id. § 37.071(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
138 Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness:  How “Future Dangerousness” Catches the Least 
Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 145, 146 & n.2 (2008) (“Future dangerousness is a requisite sentencing factor 
in two states, an optional statutory aggravating factor in four states, and an articulated 
non-statutory aggravating factor in at least two dozen states and the federal system.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
139 Id. at 146–47; see also id. at 192 app. B (listing the twenty-four people that the state of Vir-
ginia has executed “based on future dangerousness alone”). 
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the future dangerousness allegation need not comply with Ring’s 
mandates.140  For example, in 2004, condemned murderer Jesus 
Flores argued that his indictment failed to comply with Ring because 
an element of his death eligibility—that he posed a continuing threat 
to society—was not included in the charging document.141  The court 
dismissed this argument summarily: 
The statutory maximum punishment in a capital murder case is death.  
Including the issue of future dangerousness in the indictment would not 
allow the State to seek a more severe punishment.  Accordingly, Apprendi 
and Ring do not apply.142 
Whether or not the Constitution requires the defendant’s future 
dangerousness to be specifically alleged in the indictment,143 the Tex-
as court’s interpretation of the capital statute is demonstrably wrong 
under Ring.  While it is technically true that the maximum penalty for 
capital murder in Texas is death, it was equally true in Arizona that 
the maximum penalty for first degree murder was death prior to 
Ring.144  It does not follow, however, that the penalty of death may be 
imposed based solely upon a conviction of murder; rather, the Texas 
capital statute makes a finding of future dangerousness a prerequisite 
to the imposition of death, just as other states use aggravating factors 
to narrow the class of death-eligible persons.  A future dangerousness 
finding is a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty in 
Texas; if this finding is a factual one, Ring requires that it be found 
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. 
 
140 See, e.g., Garza v. State, No. AP-75217, 2008 WL 1914673, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 
2008); Cubas v. State, No. AP-74953, 2005 WL 3956312, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 
2006); Flores v. State, No. 74258, 2004 WL 3098822, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 20, 
2004).  However, as we demonstrate in the next section, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
has recognized in other cases that the question of future dangerousness is “legally essen-
tial to the punishment.”  See infra pp. 82–83 and note 153.  Thus, these cases properly illu-
strate the court’s imprecision with regard to the Sixth Amendment implications of the 
Texas capital statute rather than its outright rejection of those implications. 
141 Flores, 2004 WL 3098822, at *6. 
142 Id.; see also Cubas, 2005 WL 3956312, at *7 (reaffirming that Apprendi and Ring are inap-
plicable to Texas’ capital scheme).  The reasoning in Cubas is particularly troubling.  In 
Cubas, the court cites exclusively to cases finding Ring inapplicable to the finding of miti-
gating evidence.  Cubas, 2005 WL 3956312, at *7.  For the reasons set forth below, this 
conclusion as to the weighing process in Texas is implausible; but it carries no weight 
with regard to the determination of whether Texas’ lone aggravating factor is present. 
143 The indictment requirement of the Fifth Amendment has never been incorporated into 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).  All that is required is that the charging documents satisfy the 
notice requirements of due process. 
144 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 643–44 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
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The future dangerousness determination turns on a jury’s assess-
ment of whether facts such as the nature of the crime, lack of re-
morse, mental illness, and criminal history, on balance, suggest a 
propensity for future violence.145  This is obviously not a finding of 
historical fact—it is in many ways the opposite, a prediction of the fu-
ture.  However, future dangerousness is no less factual than the ex-
amples of other eligibility factors discussed in the previous section,146 
and in other contexts, state and federal courts have routinely re-
garded the question of future dangerousness as a question of fact.147  
But it is important to realize that it is not on this basis that the Texas 
court held Ring to be inapplicable to the finding of future dange-
rousness.148  The court did not hold that this determination—like ba-
lancing mitigation and aggravation—is a moral judgment and not a 
finding of fact.  Rather, the court simply and inexplicably expressed 
its view that future dangerousness is not a threshold question to the 
imposition of death.149 
This conclusion reflects the hostility of lower courts to efforts to 
reconcile the longstanding Eighth Amendment requirements with 
the more recent Sixth Amendment constraints.  After Furman, Texas 
was forced to adopt a capital sentencing regime that narrowed the 
class of death eligible murderers—Texas complied with this Eighth 
Amendment obligation by making the ultimate penalty contingent 
on a showing that the individual represents a “continuing threat to 
society.”  While the existence of the narrowing factor in Texas law can 
therefore be traced to the Eighth Amendment’s requirements, the 
factor is not therefore immune from more recent Sixth Amendment 
requirements. 
 
145 Shapiro, supra note138, at 153. 
146 See supra Part III.B.1.b. 
147 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)(i)(1) (requiring that a pretrial detention order include written 
findings of fact as to whether release conditions “will not reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the person” or will “endanger the safety of any other person or the community” (empha-
sis added)); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742 (1987) (noting that denial of bail 
based on fear of future dangerousness must be justified in written “findings of fact”); see 
also People v. Buerge, No. 07CA2393, 2009 WL 3764078, at *1 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 
2009) (describing the determination as to whether one is likely to commit another sex-
ually violent crime as a “specific finding[] of fact” and thus such findings must be de-
ferred to by an appellate court). 
148 See Garza v. State, No. AP-75217, 2008 WL 1914673, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2008) 
(“Apprendi and Ring have no applicability to Article 37.071 in its current form.”). 
149 It is important not to make too much of this point.  Texas assigns the task of finding fu-
ture dangerousness to the jury.  Thus, the Ring question is more theoretical with regard 
to the Texas statute than it was with regard to the Florida statute, which purports to give 
such authority to a judge rather than the jury. 
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b.  The Selection Decision Under Texas Law 
The second part of the Texas statute—dealing with balancing the 
mitigating evidence against the case in aggravation—is much more 
open-ended than the selection determination in Florida.  Texas is an 
example of a non-weighing state; the jury is not limited to balancing 
the found aggravating factors—or factor, in this case—against the 
evidence in mitigation.150  Rather, the jury is to consider all of the evi-
dence in the case in determining whether the defendant should live 
or die. 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that this 
second inquiry—what it calls the mitigation special issue—is also not 
a fact finding that must be made by a jury under Ring.  In Perry v. 
State, the court held that the death penalty becomes a permissible 
punishment once the aggravating factor has been found.151  The ab-
sence of factors sufficient to mitigate death, therefore, is not a fact 
that increases the permissible punishment, the court reasoned; rather 
the presence of facts in mitigation can only lower the possible pu-
nishment.152 
It is, therefore, clear that what a jury is asked to decide in the mitigation 
special issue is not a “[fact] legally essential to the punishment.”  By the 
time the jury reaches the mitigation special issue, the prosecution has 
proven all aggravating “facts legally essential to the punishment.”153 
The Fifth Circuit is in accord.154 
Thus, the Texas court’s rejection of the application of Ring to the 
balancing task is on a very different basis than the Florida court’s re-
jection of the application of Ring to its statute.  The Perry court re-
jected Ring’s applicability not because the presence of sufficient miti-
gation is not a factual finding, but because it is not the kind of factual 
finding that Ring requires a jury to make.  Stated another way, whe-
reas in Florida the weighing determination might be considered a 
 
150 See supra Part III.A (distinguishing between weighing and non-weighing sentencing sys-
tems). 
151 Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d 438, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 
152 See id. at 446–48. 
153 Id. at 448 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296, 313 (2004)). 
154 See Granados v. Quarterman, 455 F.3d 529, 536–37 (5th Cir. 2006) (“We are not per-
suaded that Texas violated any principle of Apprendi or Ring in the trial of this case.  Spe-
cifically, it did not do so by not asking the jury to find an absence of mitigating circums-
tances beyond a reasonable doubt in addition to questions it required the jury to answer.  
Put another way, a finding of mitigating circumstances reduces a sentence from death, ra-
ther than increasing it to death.” (footnote omitted)). 
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statutory prerequisite for death eligibility, the Texas statute explicitly 
conditions eligibility on future dangerousness alone. 
This argument makes sense so far as it goes, but it also proves too 
much.  Apprendi was an explicit rejection of this sort of formalism, of 
the idea that the state, by terming a fact a sentencing factor rather 
than an element of the offense, could remove that fact from the jury.  
The Texas Court’s analysis—that the presence of sufficient mitigating 
factors is a condition that can only lower the possible penalty—
constitutes exactly the kind of formalism that Apprendi rejected. 
For as long as there has been an Apprendi right to jury adjudica-
tion, there has been concern about the ease with which a legislature 
could manipulate Apprendi’s protections.  In her Apprendi dissent, Jus-
tice O’Connor explained that the rule mandating jury fact finding 
was hollow insofar as a state legislature could simply restructure the 
statute so as to evade the new jury right. 
Thus, consistent with our decision in Patterson, New Jersey could cure its 
sentencing scheme, and achieve virtually the same results, by drafting its 
weapons possession statute in the following manner:  First, New Jersey 
could prescribe, in the weapons possession statute itself, a range of 5 to 
20 years’ imprisonment for one who commits that criminal offense.  
Second, New Jersey could provide that a defendant convicted under the 
statute whom a judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, not to 
have acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual on the basis of race 
may receive a sentence no greater than 10 years’ imprisonment.155 
O’Connor argued, in essence, that all of the Court’s work could be 
undone by making facts relevant to aggravating a sentence into facts 
relevant to mitigating a sentence instead.  Such facts, unlike facts in 
aggravation, need not be proved to a jury under any fair reading of 
Ring. 
However, in oft-overlooked language from the Apprendi majority, 
the Court responded to Justice O’Connor’s concern:  “if New Jersey 
simply reversed the burden of the hate crime finding (effectively as-
suming a crime was performed with a purpose to intimidate and then 
requiring a defendant to prove that it was not), we would be required 
to question whether the revision was constitutional under this Court’s 
prior [due process] decisions.”156  This language has been construed 
 
155 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 541–42 (2000) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
156 Id. at 490–91 n.16 (citation omitted) (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 
(1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698–702 (1975)); see Nancy J. King & Susan R. 
Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1471 (2001) (summarizing the dissent’s 
fear in Apprendi that “[s]imply by raising the maximum sentence for a crime . . . a legisla-
ture could ensure that the very same sentence enhancements that were deemed elements 
by the Court’s opinion would continue to be adjudicated without a jury finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). 
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as forging a marriage between the Court’s longstanding due process 
jurisprudence—the Winship line of cases—and the newly minted Ap-
prendi jury rights.157  In other words, the jury rights established by Ap-
prendi and its progeny are not mere lessons in statutory drafting for 
legislatures; the Court made clear its view that any efforts to evade the 
jury requirement announced in Apprendi are subject to the limitations 
of due process.158 
While the precise nature of the “constitutional limits” on a legisla-
ture’s ability to redefine a particular finding as a non-element has 
remained uncertain,159 the impact of Apprendi on criminal statutes has 
clearly been profound.  State courts have recognized that legislatures 
cannot avoid the jury right by merely shifting the burden of proving 
the “essential elements” of a crime onto criminal defendants.  In 
practical terms, this has resulted in victories for defendants when leg-
islatures have attempted to make facts such as sexual motivations, se-
rious bodily injury, proximity to a school, use of a firearm, and racial 
animus, to name but a few, as mere defenses, sentencing factors, or 
non-elements.160  There is now broad recognition that if a crime re-
quires a fact that serves as an essential element for the conviction, it 
must be tried to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.161  In a 
nutshell, the “formalism of the Apprendi rule is not pointless.”162  The 
jury right cannot be evaded by simply redefining critical elements as 
defenses or sentencing factors, and by analogy it seems that due 
process imposes limitations on the ability of a state to prescribe a sen-
tencing default in favor of death. 
Consider the implications of a capital sentencing regime that fails 
to comply with this theory of due process.  For example, imagine a 
capital statute that provides that that all killings are punishable by 
 
157 Allen & Hastert, supra note 121, at 207 (“Apprendi and its progeny have married the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.”). 
158 It should be noted upfront that in the same breath that the Court acknowledged the due 
process limits, it also invoked a historical distinction “between facts in aggravation of pu-
nishment and facts in mitigation.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490–91 n.16.  The Court was re-
ferring to the distinction between affirmative defenses and facts required to prove guilt, 
yet the context of the comment suggests broader applicability. 
159 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). 
160 Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295, 305 
(2001) (noting that “Apprendi is making a big difference, in ways favorable to defendants” 
in cases such as these). 
161 See, e.g., Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (noting that failure to give jury 
instructions requiring the State to prove every element of the offense is a violation of due 
process); Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 266 A.2d 726, 731 (Pa. 1970) (stating it is an “un-
questioned requirement that the Commonwealth establish every element of any crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
162 King & Klein, supra note 156, at 1486. 
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death but that a defendant will be spared if no aggravating factors are 
present or if the aggravating factors that are present are outweighed 
by the mitigating factors that are also present.  The effect of such a 
statute would be to impose upon the defendant an obligation to dis-
qualify himself from death.  Such a result would appear to comply 
with both the Eighth Amendment—it makes meaningful distinctions 
between who lives and who dies—and the Sixth Amendment—the 
facts necessary to support a finding of death are all found by a jury 
rather than a judge.  There are significant constitutional concerns 
with such an approach, however, based on the due process right, a 
right that has, through Apprendi, been “married” to the Sixth 
Amendment jury right.163  Cases like Perry show, however, that the due 
process concerns recognized in Apprendi, which are triggered when a 
state drafts its statute so as to undermine the purpose and spirit of the 
jury right, have gone unheeded in the capital context. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in one of its few post-Ring opi-
nions confronting such an issue, upheld just this kind of burden shift-
ing in the capital context.  In Kansas v. Marsh,164 the Court endorsed a 
sentencing provision that provided for the death penalty if the state 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the case in aggravation was at 
least as strong as the case in mitigation.  Marsh argued that this stan-
dard enabled the jury to impose the death penalty in the event of 
“equipoise” between the factors in aggravation and mitigation and 
thus had the effect of diminishing the role of the mitigation and in-
dividuation as an element of capital sentencing eligibility.  The Court 
agreed with this description of the Kansas statute, but found no con-
stitutional violation with such a statute. 
In aggregate, our precedents confer upon defendants the right to 
present sentencers with information relevant to the sentencing decision 
and oblige sentencers to consider that information in determining the 
appropriate sentence.  The thrust of our mitigation jurisprudence ends 
here.  “[W]e have never held that a specific method for balancing miti-
gating and aggravating factors in a capital sentencing proceeding is con-
stitutionally required.”  Rather, this Court has held that the States enjoy a 
“constitutionally permissible range of discretion in imposing the death 
penalty.”165 
 
163 Allen & Hastert, supra note 121, at 207. 
164 548 U.S. 163, 173 (2006). 
165 Id. at 175 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 
494 U.S. 299, 308 (1990); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988)). 
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In support of this conclusion, the Court relied on its earlier opinion 
in Walton,166 which, in addition to holding that the Sixth Amendment 
was not implicated by judge findings as to aggravating factors, held 
that placing the burden of proof on the defendant to show that there 
were sufficient facts in mitigation to justify sparing his life was not in-
compatible with either the Eighth Amendment or due process.167  In 
other words, the Court expressly relied on a pre-Ring, pre-Apprendi 
holding to vindicate the sort of statutory gamesmanship and formal-
ism that seems to expressly contravene these later decisions. 
Consequently, at least as it is currently understood, Ring provides 
very little in the way of restraint on the way states structure their capi-
tal statutes.  The Court seems in Marsh to endorse, at least implicitly, 
statutes that would excuse the state from having to prove that the case 
in aggravation is stronger than the case in mitigation.  Even if, as we 
argue, balancing is a finding of fact, Ring only applies to that finding 
if it increases the defendant’s potential penalty.  If a state can take 
such balancing outside of Ring’s protections by fiat—by changing ba-
lancing from a hurdle for the prosecution to clear to an opportunity 
for the defendant to spare his life—then Ring’s promise is a hollow 
one indeed.  In sum, although the Court has married the Apprendi 
and Winship rights, it appears willing to ignore a key aspect of this re-
lationship; while the Court has policed burden-shifting to the defen-
dant in the non-capital context it has not done so with equal vigor 
with regard to capital sentencing. 
As the next two statutes make clear, however, burden-shifting is 
not the only way for a state to avoid Ring’s mandate.  We show that 
states can also remove Ring from the equation by dispensing with any 
legalistic limits on the process of balancing, by making it look more 
like a moral judgment and less like a legal one. 
3. California 
California occupies an odd place in America’s capital punishment 
regime.  California has a death row population of nearly 700 people, 
by far the largest in the country.168  However, the state has executed 
 
166 Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 655–56 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
167 The Court intimates in Marsh that if it believed that the Kansas statute made the death 
penalty the “default” penalty for homicide, this would have constitutional implications.  
Marsh, 548 U.S. at 178–79.  But it is not entirely clear why this should be true. 
168 Death Row Inmates by State and Size of Death Row by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year#state 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (citing CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. 
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only thirteen people since Gregg was decided in 1976,169 a rate of less 
than one execution every two years.  At this rate, it would take Cali-
fornia more than 1,400 years to execute all if its condemned inmates, 
even if it were to stop imposing death sentences tomorrow. 
California’s capital statute has caused appellate courts a fair 
amount of confusion over the last thirty years.170  Unlike most states, 
California uses special circumstances, proved at the trial stage, to de-
termine a defendant’s death eligibility.  If a defendant is convicted of 
first degree murder and at least one special circumstance is proven to 
the jury, the defendant is eligible for death, and the case proceeds to 
a separate sentencing trial.171  At this sentencing phase, a list of factors 
is set forth by statute for the jury’s consideration in determining 
whether the defendant lives or dies.  The jury is not told which of 
these factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, nor told spe-
cifically how to balance them against one another.172  In contrast to 
 
FUND, DEATH ROW U.S.A. (2009), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/DRUSASummer2009.pdf); Div. of Adult Operations, Death Row Tracking Sys-
tem Condemned Inmate Summary List, CAL. DEP’T CORR. & REHAB. (last visited Feb. 18, 
2011), 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/CondemnedInmateSummary.pdf. 
169 Office of Pub. & Emp. Comm’ns, Condemned Inmates Who Have Died Since 1978, CAL. DEP’T 
CORR. & REHAB. (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/
docs/CIWHD.pdf. 
170 See, e.g., Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 222–23 (2006) (disagreeing with the conclusion 
of the Court of Appeals that California is a weighing state and concluding the opposite). 
171 The Supreme Court has endorsed this approach to death eligibility and selection against 
Eighth Amendment challenge.  See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971–72 
(1994) (“To render a defendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we 
have indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one 
‘aggravating circumstance’ (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase.”). 
172 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2009): 
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the fol-
lowing factors if relevant: 
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the 
present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be 
true pursuant to Section 190.1. 
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved 
the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to 
use force or violence. 
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. 
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal con-
duct or consented to the homicidal act. 
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the de-
fendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his con-
duct. 
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substan-
tial domination of another person. 
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
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the special circumstances which require a yes or no answer,173 the sen-
tencing factors set forth in the California capital statute are open-
ended and at least potentially ambiguous.  However, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has repeatedly rejected Eighth Amendment challenges 
to the statute; in fact, the Court has reasoned that California’s open-
ended sentencing has advantages over the use of so-called proposi-
tional or true/false factors: 
In our decisions holding a death sentence unconstitutional because 
of a vague sentencing factor, the State had presented a specific proposi-
tion that the sentencer had to find true or false (e.g., whether the crime 
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel).  We have held, under certain 
sentencing schemes, that a vague propositional factor used in the sen-
tencing decision creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the mark of 
the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process prohibited by Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Those concerns are mitigated when a fac-
tor does not require a yes or a no answer to a specific question, but in-
stead only points the sentencer to a subject matter.174 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the Sixth 
Amendment implications of California’s statute, the California Su-
preme Court has consistently held that Ring does not apply at all in 
the sentencing phase of a capital trial.175  The Court has stated expli-
citly that the jury’s decision that the case in aggravation outweighs the 
case in mitigation is a moral one, not a factual one.176  “Unlike the 
guilt determination, ‘the sentencing function is inherently moral and 
normative, not factual’ . . . and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-
proof quantification.”  The United States Supreme Court decisions 
 
ments of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects 
[sic] of intoxication. 
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his partic-
ipation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. 
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though 
it is not a legal excuse for the crime. 
173 California Penal Code Section 190.2 sets forth twenty-two special circumstances including 
several with multiple subparts.  Examples include:  (1) the murder was intentional and 
carried out for financial gain; (3) multiple murder; (7) the victim was a peace officer; 
(15) the defendant killed intentionally by means of lying in wait.  Id. § 190.2. 
174 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 974–75 (citations omitted); see also, California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 
992, 1008–09 n.22 (1983) (“[T]he fact that the jury is given no specific guidance on how 
the commutation factor is to figure into its determination presents no constitutional 
problem.”). 
175 People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1155 (Cal. 2003). 
176 See id.  Because it is the special circumstance finding, and not the finding of any aggravat-
ing factor that makes a defendant eligible for death, no aggravating factor need be found 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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rendered in Ring v. Arizona and Apprendi v. New Jersey do not compel a 
different conclusion.”177 
The California Court is thus quite clear about how its capital sta-
tute operates.  The trial stage requires findings of fact that invoke the 
jury right.  A defendant is not death-eligible unless the jury finds the 
elements of first degree murder and the special circumstance allega-
tions to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  By contrast, at 
the sentencing phase, there is simply no fact finding to be done.  Ac-
cording to the state high court, the jury’s role in capital sentencing is 
“moral and normative” rather than factual.  While Ring obviously ap-
plies at the trial stage,178 the California Court has consistently held 
that it does not apply at the sentencing stage. 
Although the California courts have not explained this position 
with great care,179 it is a difficult proposition with which to disagree.  
California’s capital statute may contain the language of balancing the 
case in aggravation against the case in mitigation, but, unlike in a 
weighing state like Florida, it does not require any specific findings 
regarding either aggravating evidence or mitigating evidence.  Each 
juror may consider different factors; different jurors may give differ-
ent weight to different factors.  In fact, many of the factors set forth 
by the statute defy the very notion of fact finding.  For example, un-
der sentencing factor (i) the jury is instructed to consider the defen-
dant’s age at the time of the offense.  It is not clear whether the jury 
is to consider the defendant’s relatively young (or old) age at the 
time of the offense as a factor in aggravation or in mitigation.  In fact, 
the California court has been clear that the legislature did not mean 
to assign either aggravating or mitigating significance to the defen-
dant’s age, but rather to merely alert the jury to the factor for its dis-
cretionary consideration.  The jury is to make of that factor, and all of 
the others, what it will.  This kind of subjective, open-ended, un-
bounded decision making is different in kind and not just in degree 
from the decisions juries make during the guilt phase of a criminal 
trial. 
California thus demonstrates the ease with which the ultimate 
question of life and death can be removed from the jury after Ring.  
 
177 People v. Manriquez, 123 P.3d 614, 644 (Cal. 2005) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. 
Hawthorne, 841 P.2d 118, 142 (Cal. 1992)). 
178 The California Court has held that Ring applies to the special circumstance findings, 
which must be proven to a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt.  See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 
181 P.3d 947, 1022–23 (Cal. 2008). 
179 The position was stated first in the pre-Ring case People v. Hawthorne, 841 P.2d 118, 142 
(Cal. 1992), modified on reh’g, 841 P.2d 118 (Cal. 1993), and has been repeated, as a man-
tra, in numerous decisions since then. 
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Because the selection question is described by the California courts as 
a moral rather than a factual one, it simply falls outside of Ring’s cov-
erage.  On its own terms this logic seems to us unimpeachable; the 
selection process in California, as described by the California courts, 
does not call for the finding of any facts and thus does not implicate 
Ring at all.  While there may be Eighth Amendment problems with a 
sentencing regime that leaves to the sentencer’s discretion the ques-
tion of whether a particular fact is aggravating or mitigating of guilt,180 
it would be a stretch to argue that Ring applies to such a regime. 
The logical conclusion of this approach—of making the sentenc-
ing decision less legalistic and more open-ended—is Georgia’s capital 
statute. 
4.  Georgia 
Georgia’s statute, which was the subject of both the Furman and 
Gregg decisions, is a paradigmatic example of a non-weighing statute, 
in which the material that can form the basis of the case in aggrava-
tion is not limited to the statutory aggravating factors.181  But more 
than this, Georgia’s statute is remarkable for the fact that it leaves the 
selection decision—whether the defendant is to live or die—to the 
unfettered discretion of the trier of fact.  While California merely 
provides some guideposts for the jury in making what is ultimately a 
moral decision regarding the defendant’s sentence, in Georgia the 
state has consistently refused to provide the trier of fact with any 
guidance whatsoever.182 
Zant v. Stephens183 remains the Supreme Court’s definitive ruling 
on the constitutionality of Georgia’s open-ended selection proce-
dures.  Stephens brought an Eighth Amendment challenge to the sta-
tute, claiming that its amorphous nature failed to comply with Fur-
man’s requirement that a state make meaningful distinctions between 
who lives and who dies.  Before it could evaluate this claim, however, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found it necessary to certify a question to the 
Georgia Supreme Court, asking them to characterize the role played 
by aggravating factors during the selection stage of the state capital 
 
180 And, of course, the Supreme Court has rejected those claims with regard to this statute.  
See e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 976 (1994). 
181 After Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion), and Lockett v. 
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), a state cannot impose limits on what evi-
dence may be considered in mitigation. 
182 See GA. CODE ANN § 17-10-31 (2006) (laying out the findings that a jury must make to rec-
ommend the death penalty, without providing any guidelines). 
183 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
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punishment statute.184  The Georgia court answered that aggravating 
factors served no official role in sentence selection; once the state 
had cleared the qualification hurdle—once it had proven at least one 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt—the aggravat-
ing circumstance was afforded no statutory significance in determin-
ing the ultimate punishment.185  Rather, the question of life or death 
under the Georgia statute was left to the unfettered discretion of the 
jury.186  The Georgia court famously invoked the metaphor of a pyra-
mid pierced by planes; each plane narrows the pool of murders until 
only the very top of the pyramid, those sentenced to death, remains.  
The Georgia court described the top of the pyramid as follows: 
[A] plane separates, from all cases in which a penalty of death may be 
imposed, those cases in which it shall be imposed.  There is an absolute 
discretion in the factfinder to place any given case below the plane and 
not impose death.  The plane itself is established by the factfinder.  In es-
tablishing the plane, the factfinder considers all evidence in extenuation, 
mitigation and aggravation of punishment.187 
This sort of unbridled sentencing discretion appears to be precisely 
the sort of lightning-strike model of justice that was held unconstitu-
tional in Furman.188  For the last fifty years, unchecked discretion has 
been equated with a level of capriciousness that is prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.189  Al-
though this statute might appear to be a clear violation of Furman’s 
mandate of meaningful distinctions, the Zant Court held otherwise.  
Because rules govern the finding of aggravating factors during the 
earlier eligibility determination, the Court reasoned, Furman’s re-
 
184 Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416–17 (1982). 
185 Zant v. Stephens (Zant I), 297 S.E.2d 1, 3–4 (Ga. 1982) (discussing the role that statutory 
aggravating circumstances have on the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia). 
186 The Supreme Court upheld the Georgia statute at issue in Zant on the ground that the 
guiding of the jury’s discretion, required by the Eighth Amendment, occurs earlier in the 
process of adjudicating death.  Zant, 462 U.S. at 879 (holding that the Georgia scheme 
provides for “categorical narrowing at the definition stage”).  In other words, the Su-
preme Court determines that so long as the pool of murderers is meaningfully narrowed 
by a death penalty scheme, the ultimate decision may be made in an unguided way.  Id. 
(noting that the “categorical narrowing” convinces the Court “that the structure of the 
statute is constitutional”). 
187 Id. at 871 (quoting Zant I, 297 S.E.2d at 3–4). 
188 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
randomness in determining when the death penalty is handed out). 
189 The Court’s decision to uphold Georgia’s sentencing scheme in Gregg effectively constitu-
tionalized the Model Penal Code’s approach to capital punishment.  See supra note 57.  
Interestingly, the drafters of the Code have now rejected as no less arbitrary than the pre-
Furman systems the very provision relied on by states like Georgia and endorsed by the 
Court.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 & cmt. b (Discussion Draft No. 2 2009). 
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quirement is satisfied, and Georgia is free to structure the ultimate 
selection decision as it wishes.190 
Stephens’ challenge to the Georgia statute was an Eighth 
Amendment claim; at that time Zant was decided, the Supreme Court 
clearly believed that the Sixth Amendment did not apply in the capi-
tal sentencing context.191  However, the Ring analysis of this reading 
of the Georgia statute appears relatively straightforward.192  While we, 
in contrast to most appellate courts that have considered the issue, 
tend to view weighing as a factual finding subject to Ring, we have 
trouble doing so with regard to Georgia’s non-weighing sentencing 
scheme.  As the U.S. Supreme Court described the statute:  “[i]n 
Georgia, unlike some other States, the jury is not instructed to give 
any special weight to any aggravating circumstance, to consider mul-
tiple aggravating circumstances any more significant than a single 
such circumstance, or to balance aggravating against mitigating cir-
cumstances pursuant to any special standard.”193  The question posed 
to the Georgia jury at the selection stage is a purely moral one—the 
jury is merely asked to determine in its discretion whether the defen-
dant should live or die.194  Despite the use of the phrase “factfinder” 
 
190 In this way, the Court’s opinion echoes the discredited language of McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183 (1971).  Decided the year before Furman, the Court endorsed the grant 
of limitless discretion to the jury under California’s then-applicable statute: 
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, 
we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion 
of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to any-
thing in the Constitution.  The States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted 
with the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will 
act with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a va-
riety of factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or by the 
arguments of defense counsel.  For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate 
factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of consider-
ation, for no list of circumstances would ever be really complete.  The infinite va-
riety of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either mea-
ningless “boiler-plate” or a statement of the obvious that no jury would need. 
  Id. at 207–08. 
191 See supra Part II.A. 
192 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607–09 (2002).  Perhaps for this reason, there is very 
little decisional law in the Georgia state courts about how Ring applies to its statute. 
193 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 873–74 (1983). 
194 There is a paradox regarding the scope of the Ring protections.  As Judge Morris Hoff-
man and Professor Robert Weisberg have both independently concluded, the jury-right is 
most meaningful when the jury’s discretion is least constrained.  Morris B. Hoffman, 
Booker, Pragmatism and the Moral Jury, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 455, 456, 465–77 (2005) 
(discussing the moral jury’s role in criminal sentencing and the benefits of eliminating a 
mandatory sentencing scheme); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 
305, 391 (claiming that legal formulas may “distort” the jurors’ decisions); Weisberg, su-
pra note 8, 200–01 (discussing the notion that broader crime statutes allow for “good 
sense in calibrating punishment”); see also Joseph L. Hoffman, Where’s the Buck?—Juror 
Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1137 (1995) 
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by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Georgia statute does not contain 
even the pretense of factual evaluation—the jury is told neither what 
factors are relevant nor how to balance them against one and other.  
Rather, the jury is instructed, in essence, to use its moral sense to de-
termine the appropriate sentence.  Rules do not govern this process; 
each juror must decide for herself what punishment is appropriate 
using her own factors and metrics.195 
This sort of moral judgment—looking at the defendant, his act, 
his past, and determining without guidance whether he should live or 
die—simply cannot colorably be deemed a fact finding.  As Professor  
Monaghan has explained, fact finding is an inquiry into “what hap-
pened” such that factual findings “respond to inquiries about who, 
when, what, and where.”196  Obviously, the jury’s unfettered decision 
as to life or death bears none of these hallmarks of fact finding.  
There is no sense that the jury’s task is to arrive at a “correct” judg-
ment; if the trial court cannot explain to the jury what its task is, it is 
hard to see how an appellate court could find the result incorrect.197  
While we have great concerns about the kind of decisions produced 
by such discretion—we believe, in short, that Zant was wrongly de-
cided and that the Georgia statute violates the Eighth Amendment—
 
(relying on Weisberg’s research to conclude that the “mystifying language of legal formal-
ity” may allow a juror to believe that he or she is not morally responsible for a capital sen-
tencing decision (quoting Weisberg, Deregulating Death, supra, at 392) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
195 In this way, the Georgia statute closely parallels the California statute approved by the 
Supreme Court in McGautha, 402 U.S. at 183, and overruled by Furman, 408 U.S. 238 
(1972).  In McGautha, overturned only a year later in Furman, the Supreme Court ap-
proved California’s standard-less discretion statute on the basis that rules are inappro-
priate to govern the kind of life and death decision being made by a capital jury.  The 
Court stated:  “[t]o identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides 
and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteris-
tics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing authority, 
appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.”  Id. at 204. 
196 Monaghan, supra note 6, at 235 (emphasis omitted); see also Clarence Morris, Law and 
Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1304–06 (1942) (discussing the practical distinction between 
questions of law and questions of fact). 
197 However, the Supreme Court was influenced, in upholding the Georgia capital scheme, 
by the fact that jurors’ decisions were reviewed by the Georgia high court to ensure pro-
portionality.  See, e.g., Zant, 462 U.S. at 879 (taking into account that the Georgia Su-
preme Court had reviewed the jurors’ death sentence in considering the constitutionality 
of the Georgia death penalty statute); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (rea-
soning that the “review function” of the Georgia Supreme Court provides “additional as-
surance” that the jurors’ decisions were appropriate).  However, a decision that a jury’s 
sentencing decision is disproportionate cannot necessarily be seen as a rejection of the 
decision that a particular jury came to.  A single jury simply cannot ensure the proportio-
nality of the sentence it imposes; such a task, of necessity, must be conducted by a legal 
actor with access to the facts of more than one case. 
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it is difficult to arrive at that result under the language of Ring.  Ring 
requires a jury only when the decision at issue hinges on a finding of 
fact that is functionally equivalent to an element.198  And the Georgia 
statute is quite explicit that any fact finding, any rule-boundedness 
occurs at the eligibility stage and not at the selection stage. 
If the unfettered judgment of the trier of fact whether the defen-
dant lives or dies were treated as an Apprendi fact, then essentially all 
sentencing decisions would be subject to Apprendi’s requirements as 
well.  For example, the unfettered discretion that judges have to sen-
tence within the range permitted by statute is at least as much a fac-
tual conclusion as the decision whether a defendant should live or 
die under a sentencing scheme like Georgia’s.  And Justice Scalia—in 
many ways the chief architect of the Apprendi revolution199—made 
quite clear his view that Ring is about fact finding, not about the right 
to be sentenced by a jury.200  If his views express those of the majority 
in Ring, if Ring is truly limited to findings of fact,201 then the Sixth 
Amendment right simply cannot be stretched to include decisions—
even capital decisions—based on standardless discretion.  If this is 
true, then Ring’s practical impact might be very modest indeed. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
All of this brings us back to the start, to the question of how the 
Sixth and Eighth Amendments interact in the capital context.  We 
have attempted to show, through the application of Ring to a number 
of representative capital statutes, that the Court’s apparent watershed 
decision has not forced much change.  State and federal courts con-
tinue to take a crabbed reading of exactly what constitutes fact find-
ing and as a result, appellate judges are permitted to reweigh aggra-
vating and mitigating factors, and, at least in the case of Florida, a 
 
198 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (“Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating 
factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of the greater offense,’ the 
Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” (citation omitted) (quoting Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000))). 
199 Commentators tend to substantially credit (or blame) Justice Scalia for the Apprendi revo-
lution.  Professor Frank O. Bowman has summarized Justice Scalia’s role as one of seduc-
ing four other Justices to his approach of “confounding simplicities.”  See Frank O. Bow-
man, III, Debacle:  How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and How It 
Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 477 (2010). 
200 Supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
201 As the history set forth in Part II.B, supra, indicates, Justice Scalia is on firm ground; since 
its decisions in Jones and Apprendi, the Court has consistently framed the Sixth Amend-
ment right in terms of factual findings. 
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judge is implicitly permitted to reject a jury’s conclusion that the case 
in aggravation is outweighed by the case in mitigation.202 
 
202 The abrogation of the jury’s role is certainly not limited to Florida, however.  Relying on 
Supreme Court authority, a number of states have held that judicial reweighing on ap-
peal—in the event, say that an aggravating factor found by the jury is invalidated—is 
permitted.  See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1990) (holding that 
harmless error analysis or an independent reweighing of the aggravators and mitigators 
by an appellate court will cure a sentencing court’s reliance on an invalid aggravator); id. 
at 754 (observing that in some instances “peculiarities in a case make appellate reweigh-
ing or harmless-error analysis extremely speculative or impossible”); Neff v. State, 849 
N.E.2d 556, 562 (Ind. 2006) (noting that sometimes it is “more efficient” for an appellate 
court to “reweigh the aggravators and mitigators”); Leslie v. Warden, 59 P.3d 440, 446–47 
(Nev. 2002) (holding that it is appropriate to reweigh aggravators and mitigators after 
striking an aggravator); State v. Baston, 709 N.E.2d 128, 137 (Ohio 1999) (upholding ap-
pellate reweighing and refusing to presume that the trial court acted with bias).  Clemons 
v. Mississippi holds that such reweighing was consistent with the Court’s Sixth Amend-
ment jurisprudence as it existed in 1990.  Clemons, 494 U.S. at 745 (rejecting the argu-
ment that a “defendant’s right to a jury trial would be infringed when an appellate court 
invalidates one of two or more aggravating circumstances found by the jury”).  However, 
it seems beyond peradventure that such a process violates the Court’s post-Ring under-
standing of the Sixth Amendment.  As Judge Merritt has explained, “it seems very likely 
that Ring has overruled Clemons [because] [i]n Ring, the Court held that defendants have 
a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury, not a judge, find aggravating circumstances in 
death penalty cases [and] [i]t is hard to imagine how this principle would not also apply 
to the reweighing process described in Clemons.”  Baston v. Bagley, 420 F.3d 632, 639 n.1 
(6th Cir. 2005).  The effect of Ring on Clemons has been slow to percolate because the 
Ring rule was held to be non-retroactive, thus preventing lower courts from reaching the 
issue in cases on habeas review.  See, e.g., Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 
2004).  In addition, the alternative solution proposed by Clemons for remedying sentenc-
ings premised on at least one invalid aggravator—harmless error review—might also be 
constitutionally dubious.  Certain constitutional defects involving juries, even if the harm 
is more symbolic than tangible, are simply not amenable to harmless error review.  Cf. 
Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing Batson claim “is a 
structural error that is not subject to harmless error review”); Fred P. Cavese, Case Note, 
Clemons v. Mississippi—Shortcut to the Executioner?, 22 PAC. L.J. 935, 968 (1991) (conclud-
ing that it will be the rare case in which harmless error analysis of a capital sentence is 
appropriate, and observing that “all nine justices [in Clemons] agree[d] that a harmless 
error ruling in that case would have been strained”); John M.M. Greabe, Spelling Guilt out 
of a Record?  Harmless-Error Review of Conclusive Mandatory Presumptions and Elemental Misde-
scriptions, 74 B.U. L. REV. 819, 822–23 (1994) (considering the history of harmless error 
and explaining that appellate determinations that an error was harmless represent an en-
croachment on the jury’s authority, and recognizing the general rule that violations of 
fundamental, basic trial rights can never be harmless); id. at 849 (discussing in a different 
context the fact that core jury right violations are sufficiently fundamental to be regarded 
as structural errors); Kendra Oyer, Comment, Classifying Constructive Amendment as Trial or 
Structural Error, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 609, 616 (2010) (“Classifying all weighable errors as tri-
al errors, however, makes the category of structural errors too narrow.”).  But see Washing-
ton v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 222 (2006) (“Failure to submit a sentencing factor to the 
jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.”); Neder v. Unit-
ed States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (applying harmless error analysis when jury was not informed 
of material element). 
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But more than that, what this trip through the states demonstrates 
is that, paradoxically, the easiest way for a state to avoid complying 
with Ring is to move toward Georgia-like unfettered discretion or to-
ward a California-like system that explicitly states that the selection 
decision is a moral rather than a factual one.  As we move along a 
continuum from Florida’s weighing statute to Georgia’s completely 
discretionary non-weighing statute, we move from a statute that to us 
obviously raises Ring concerns to one that we must admit does not.  
Given the apparent desire of the states to take capital decision mak-
ing out of the hands of juries whenever possible,203 this development 
creates a genuine concern that Ring will inevitably push the states to 
adopt the kind of unprincipled, discretionary capital system adopted 
in Georgia.  The Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, in other 
words, pushes the states to write statutes that push at the very edges of 
the Eighth Amendment’s edicts. 
In part, these criticisms of Ring as a force of change in American 
capital punishment are attributable to the Court’s narrow focus on 
fact finding.204  Unless a sentencing decision can be described as fact 
finding, it simply falls outside the Apprendi-Ring purview.  We are not 
the first, obviously, to note the narrowness of the Court’s Ring 
mandate;205 but our investigation of how that mandate plays out in 
practice demonstrates just how little force it actually exerts on the 
states today.  Because states are free to cast the ultimate sentencing 
decision as a moral choice rather than a factual finding, they are es-
sentially free to avoid Ring’s requirements altogether. 
 
203 Their desire to do so is based, in no small part, on the fact that judges, particularly politi-
cally accountable judges, are more likely to impose the death penalty than are juries.  See, 
e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Not surprising-
ly, given the political pressures they face, judges are far more likely than juries to impose 
the death penalty.  This has long been the case, and the recent experience of judicial 
overrides confirms it.  Alabama judges have vetoed only five jury recommendations of 
death, but they have condemned 47 defendants whom juries would have spared.” (citing 
HANS ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 37–50 
(1968))); see also Carrie A. Dannenfelser, Burch v. State:  Maintaining the Jury’s Traditional 
Role as the Voice of the Community in Capital Punishment Cases, 60 MD. L. REV. 417, 438 
(2001) (suggesting the susceptibility of judges to political pressure in support of execu-
tions); Stevenson, supra note 3, at 1141 (noting that some states switched from jury to 
judge sentencing based on a belief that “juries that would not impose capital punish-
ment”); id. at 1143 (“Empirical analyses of judges’ behavior in the override states reveals a 
correlation between judges’ use of the override power and the dates of judicial elec-
tions.”). 
204 Philip English Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment:  An Historical Note, 54 
B.U. L. REV. 32, 32–34 (1974). 
205 See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 155 (2004) (“Ring’s reliance on the Sixth Amendment entitle-
ment to jury fact-finding has a tired, museum-like quality to it.”). 
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For those of us who believe that the jury has an important role to 
play in capital sentencing, then, perhaps a more robust solution lies 
in Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Ring.  For Breyer, it was the Eighth 
Amendment, not the Sixth, that required the presence of juries in 
the capital process.206  Citing two decades of the Court’s cruel and 
unusual punishment jurisprudence, Breyer explained that only the 
jury could reasonably be expected to express the conscience of the 
community necessary for a just and equitable death sentence. 
In this sense, Breyer is merely echoing opinions expressed earlier, 
before Ring, by one of the chief Apprendi-Ring architects, Justice Ste-
vens.  Dissenting in 1995’s Harris v. Alabama, Stevens expressed his 
displeasure with a system that allowed a judge sitting without a jury to 
reject the jury’s recommendation of leniency and to impose death in-
stead of a life sentence. 207  For Stevens, many of the traditional justifi-
cations for the death penalty disappear when it is contrasted with a 
true life sentence.  The only explanation that remains viable today is 
retribution: 
An expression of community outrage carries the legitimacy of law only if 
it rests on fair and careful consideration, as free as possible from passion 
or prejudice. . . . Jurors’ responsibilities terminate when their case ends; 
they answer only to their own consciences; they rarely have any concern 
about possible reprisals after their work is done.  More importantly, they 
focus their attention on a particular case involving the fate of one fellow 
citizen, rather than on a generalized remedy for a global category of face-
less violent criminals who, in the abstract, may appear unworthy of life.  A 
jury verdict expresses a collective judgment that we may fairly presume to 
reflect the considered view of the community.208 
There is an irony at work here.  As part of its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence—a jurisprudence requiring the states to make mea-
ningful decisions between who lives and who dies—the Supreme 
Court has fairly consistently trumpeted the fact-finding powers of the 
judge over those of the jury, not just before Ring, but since.  In Proffitt 
v. Florida, a case still cited by the Florida Supreme Court as evidence 
of the continued constitutionality of the advisory jury, the Court con-
 
206 Stevenson, supra note 3, at 1148 (describing Justice Breyer’s opinion as “a striking expan-
sion of the Eighth Amendment analysis” that was necessary to “give full meaning to the 
concept of the jury as a representative of the moral values and sensibilities of the com-
munity”). 
207 513 U.S. 504, 518–19 (1995) (noting that a jury verdict reflects the views of the communi-
ty and should be given proper deference by judges). 
208 Id.; State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973) (“[A] trial judge with experience in the 
facts of criminality possesses the requisite knowledge to balance the facts of the case 
against the standard criminal activity which can only be developed by involvement with 
the trials of numerous defendants.”). 
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cluded that decision making by judges was more likely to lead to con-
sistent results than would similar decision making by juries:  “judicial 
sentencing should lead, if anything, to even greater consistency in the 
imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a trial 
judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is 
better able to impose sentences similar to those imposed in analog-
ous cases.”209  The Court has expressed a similar ambivalence about 
the fact-finding capacities of juries elsewhere.  For example, in Schriro 
v. Summerlin,210 the Supreme Court refused to give Ring retroactive ef-
fect; refused, in other words to find that jury fact finding was so ne-
cessary to the fairness of a death penalty trial that due process re-
quired its retroactive application.211  In doing so, the Court 
disparaged the role of juror as fact-finder:  the Court found that ju-
ries were likely to be confused by trial courts’ instructions, did not 
have the benefit of seeing multiple cases, and are not used extensively 
outside of the United States.212 
Why then is the Court trumpeting the role of juries on the one 
hand—in the Sixth Amendment context—while disparaging it on the 
other—the Eighth Amendment context?  The answer seems to be, in 
part, the Court’s narrow reading of the text of the Sixth Amendment.  
The Apprendi majority believes that the Amendment compels jury fact 
finding whether it’s a good idea or not.  In rejecting Justice O’Connor’s 
repeated protests that the Apprendi majority was leading the criminal 
justice system to ruin, Justice Scalia remarked that it was the Sixth 
Amendment, not the views of the Justices, that required fact finding.  
To paraphrase the Court’s opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, refuting Justice 
Cardozo’s famous phrase about a blundering constable:  the defen-
dant gets a jury, but it is the law (not common sense) that gives it to 
him. 213 
And that is true as far as it goes, but it is only goes so far.  The 
Sixth Amendment may require just that juries make the factual find-
ings that make one eligible for death, but it does not follow that is all 
that the Constitution requires.  The criticisms of the jury that the 
Court made in Schiro are valid;214 if what we care about is accurate fact-
 
209 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976). 
210 524 U.S. 348 (2004). 
211 See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (holding that “[u]nless they fall within 
an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not 
be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are an-
nounced”). 
212 Schriro, 524 U.S. at 356. 
213 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). 
214 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 356–58. 
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finding, making sense of complicated legal doctrines, and consistency 
across cases, then the jury has trouble competing with the judge.215  
The power of the jury, the comparative advantage that it has over the 
judge, however, is expressive.216  As one commentator has observed: 
The near disappearance of jury sentencing over the last few decades has 
not been healthy for American democracy.  Strictly speaking, the regimes 
that have replaced jury sentencing are not anti-democratic—they were 
approved and to some extent designed by legislatures.  Yet an examina-
tion from the perspective of deliberative democracy shows that citizens 
have lost something important by abolishing sentencing juries.  First, as 
the role of the jury has receded, in Justice Souter’s words, to “low-level 
gatekeeping,” the criminal justice system has become ever more opaque 
to the average citizen.  [C]itizens have lost sense of the day-to-day work-
ings of the criminal justice system.  Second, the professionalization of 
sentencing has not lived up to its promise to make sentencing outcomes 
more just and publicly acceptable.217 
In sum, the jury, representative as it is of the people, was designed to 
stand and still today stands as an effective bulwark against official ty-
ranny.218  Just as jury nullification in capital cases led to moderniza-
tion of the death penalty in the nineteenth century,219 so the relative 
unwillingness of juries today to impose a death sentence is viewed by 
some as an indication of the death penalty’s inevitable demise.  While 
the Court is not wrong to require the jury to find the facts that lead to 
death, this Article demonstrates that that protection is insufficient to 
allow the jury its proper role.  The Court should take up the call of 
 
215 As one commentator has observed: 
Perhaps the main criticism of sentencing juries is that their lack of experience and 
expertise leads them to make decisions based on a fragmented understanding of 
the sentencing process.  Unable to situate the case before them within the larger 
sentencing framework, juries are said to render disparate judgments in similar 
cases in violation of the basic principle of equality before the law. 
  Iontcheva, supra note 12, at 356. 
216 Id. at 322 (“As the nullification cases demonstrate, the jury—whether at trial or at sen-
tencing—operated as a deeply political institution in the early republic.  It played a cen-
tral part in the American system of checks and balances.” (footnotes omitted)). 
217 Id. at 338–39; see also Stevenson, supra note 3 at 1152 (“Capital jury determinations consti-
tute one of the essential ‘workings of normal democratic processes in the laboratories of 
the States’ that provide the basis for an ‘across-the-board consensus’ to inform the Su-
preme Court’s judgments in applying the proportionality principle of the Eighth 
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Justices Breyer and Stevens and hold that the Eighth Amendment re-
quires that juries determine the ultimate sentence in a capital case. 
